Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog
After SG’s parents lost their parental rights, the Hixsons (grandparents) petitioned to adopt the child. Five days later, in a separate case, the Bakers (foster parents) also petitioned to adopt SG. The Bakers also asked the trial court to consolidate the two cases. Over objection by the Hixsons, the cases were consolidated.
Two weeks later, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services entered the consolidated case and consented to the Bakers attempt to adopt SG. DCFS also asked the trial court to dismiss the Hixsons’ adoption petition. The trial court did so in late September 2009.
The Hixsons wanted to appeal the dismissal of their adoption petition. In early November 2009 the trial court issued a Rule 304(a) finding (no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of an order that disposes of fewer than all parties and all issues). The Bakers also asked to sever the two cases they previously asked to consolidate.
On December 1st, the trial court entered a judgment severing the two adoption cases and striking the Hixsons’ response to the Bakers’ adoption petition. The judgment also contained a Rule 304(a) finding.
The next day, the Hixsons appealed: (1) the September dismissal of their adoption petition; (2) the December ruling that severed the adoption petitions and struck their response to the Bakers’ petition. The initial fight on appeal was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction. The Hixsons argued they could appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a). The Bakers and DCFS said Rule 304(a) was irrelevant.
Appeal of the September dismissal order.
The Hixsons appealed within 30 days of the Rule 304(a) finding, but more than 30 days after the actual dismissal. So if the dismissal required the Rule 304(a) finding to be appealable, then their appeal was timely. If the September dismissal order was appealable without the 304(a) finding, then the appeal was late and the appellate court did not have jurisdiction.
The answer depended upon whether the two adoption petitions had separate identities despite having been consolidated. The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the petitions had separate identities, meaning the September order was final and immediately (within 30 days) appealable. Here’s what the court said:
The record suggests that, even after consolidation, the two cases continued to have separate identities in the trial court. Besides the filing of all documents in one case, the record contains little evidence the trial court treated the two cases as one single suit …Thus, a Rule 304(a) finding was not required, and the Hixsons had to file their notice of appeal by October 29, 2009. Since they did not, we must dismiss that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal of the December orders severing the petitions and striking the Hixsons’ response.
The Hixsons’ appeal of the order severing the adoption petitions was made under Rule 304(a). But the appellate court dismissed this appeal too because the order severing the petitions was not a final judgment. “The trial court’s ruling on the motion to sever did not fix the rights of any parties or terminate any part of the litigation. The granting of the motion to sever was an interlocutory order that did not become final and appealable by the court’s Rule 304(a) finding. Thus, we dismiss the appeal as to the trial court’s ruling on the motion to sever.”
The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over order striking the Hixsons’ response to the Bakers’ petition. The court said the response to the Bakers’ petition was similar to a petition to intervene in the Bakers’ case, so striking the response was a final order, and thus appealable with the Rule 304(a) finding.
Read the whole case, In re the Adoption of SG, No. 4-09-0912 (5/3/10), by clicking here.