Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

In re Alfred H.H. involved a patient who was involuntarily admitted to the McFarland Mental Health Center in Illinois. Alfred appealed the trial court’s ruling that subjected him to the involuntary admission.

The trial court’s judgment was limited to a 90-day involuntary admission. That time had passed before the case reached the appellate court. So Alfred never got a hearing on appeal because the Fourth District Illinois Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot.

The court ruled that Alfred’s appeal did not raise any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine:

1. No public interest exception: “In this case, respondent challenges only (1) the sufficiency of the evidence presented to warrant his involuntary admission and (2) whether his hospitalization was the least-restrictive treatment alternative. The answer to either challenge in this particular case does not constitute a question of public importance. Nor would either answer provide an authoritative determination to guide public officers in the performance of their duties in mental-health cases. That is because orders involving involuntary admissions of other respondents undoubtedly will be entered and challenged based on the particular facts presented in such cases. In other words, resolving routine sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments will rarely have precedential value. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent has failed to clearly establish the criteria necessary to satisfy the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.”

2. No capable-of-repetition exception: “Although respondent has a history of mental illness and his psychiatrist had previously treated him on several occasions during hospitalizations, nothing in the record shows that his prior hospitalizations were as a result of petitions for involuntary admission. More importantly, even if another petition for involuntary admission were filed as to respondent, he would not be subject to the exact same action. Instead, any future involuntary-admission petition would involve the same party but a different action under different circumstances. In particular, the evidence presented in support of a future petition would be different than the evidence presented in support of the petition in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent has failed to clearly establish the second criterion necessary to satisfy the capable-of-repetition exception to the mootness doctrine.”

The appellate court rejected a standard exception to the mootness doctrine for all cases involving involuntary mental-health admission and involuntary mental-health treatment. The court favored an analysis under the standard rules.

The court also rejected a “collateral consequences” exception to the mootness doctrine. That exception refers to the possibility that “an adjudication could return to plague a respondent in some future proceedings and could affect other aspects of the respondent's life.” The appellate court stated: “We now believe that the collateral-legal-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine has no place in determining whether an issue is moot in a mental-health case. Regardless of whether a previous involuntary-admission order as to a particular respondent is upheld or reversed on appeal, that respondent's history of mental illness and involuntary treatment will continue to exist, and will be a factor that treating medical personnel may consider. It is that history that will possibly follow the respondent, not the fact of an adjudication.”

Compare this case to In re Leslie H., No. 2-05-0648 (1/5/07) (Our post of 1/11/07) and In re Kevin S., No. 5-06-0677 (4/2/08) (Our post of 6/24/08), both ruling that the mootness doctrine did not preclude appeals of involuntary admissions to mental health facilities.

This whole case, In re Alfred H.H., No. 4-07-0491 (4/28/08), is available by clicking here.

John Cinkus intended to run for village trustee in the Village of Stickney, Illinois in April 2007. But in April 2006, he was cited under the Stickney Municipal Code for disorderly conduct. After a contested hearing, Cinkus was found guilty and ordered to pay a $100 fine. When Cinkus did not appear for a continued hearing, a judgment was entered for the $100 fine. Cinkus was given notice of the judgment in November 2006.

Cinkus tried to pay the fine in February 2007, a few days before he filed his nomination petition. But by then, under the Illinois Municipal Code, the Village could not accept the payment without a hearing.

Cinkus filed his nomination petition to appear on the election ballot. The petition was met with an objection. The objection was based in the Illinois Municipal Code, which states that a person who is in arrears on a debt owed to the municipality is not eligible for elected municipal office. The local election board ruled that Cinkus owed the $100 at the time he filed his nomination petition, and was ineligible for municipal office.

Cinkus appealed the board’s decision to the circuit (trial) court. The circuit court reversed the board. The election board then appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the circuit court and agreed that Cinckus should not appear on the election ballot.

Cinkus then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed in favor of the election board. The supreme court’s opinion defined the different issues and standards of review that may arise from an election board’s decision, then more broadly analyzed the “mixed question of fact and law” standard of review. This quote from the court is lengthy, but worthwhile if you’re struggling with an appeal from an agency or election board decision, or if you think you’re grappling with a mixed question of law and fact.

[T]his court identified three types of questions that a court may encounter on administrative review of an agency decision: questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of fact and law. As a result, "[t]he applicable standard of review depends upon whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and law." … An administrative agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct. In examining an administrative agency's factual findings, a reviewing court does not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Instead, a reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether such findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. An administrative agency's factual determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident … In contrast, an agency's decision on a question of law is not binding on a reviewing court. For example, an agency's interpretation of the meaning of the language of a statute constitutes a pure question of law. Thus, the court's review is independent and not deferential … Mixed questions of fact and law "are 'questions in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.' … [T]his court held … that an examination of the legal effect of a given state of facts involves a mixed question of fact and law with a standard of review of "clearly erroneous." … [T]his court [has] explained that an administrative agency's decision is deemed "clearly erroneous" when the reviewing court is left with the "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'’

After all that, the supreme court did not state what standard of review it used in this decision. The court stated that “we are left with the sole question” of the correct interpretation of the Illinois Municipal Code. So presumably, this case presented a pure question of law, requiring an independent (de novo) standard of review. The rule of law here was disputed — i.e., the correct interpretation of the statute — so the issue was not a mixed question of law and fact.

The whole case, Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, No. 104471 (4/23/08), is available by clicking here.

Aureen Berry, a model, sued Chade Fashions for breach of contract and violation of the Illinois Right to Privacy Act. She claimed that Chade impermissibly used her photograph to promote Chade products. The trial court granted her summary judgment on liability under the Privacy Act, but ruled there were questions of fact as to breach of contract and damages. The trial court did not make a finding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (no reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order).

After Berry put in her case at trial, Chade moved for a directed verdict and to vacate the summary judgment ruling. The trial court granted Chade’s motions. Then Berry asked for reconsideration of the ruling that vacated her summary judgment, arguing that Chade’s motion was too late, having come more than 30 days after the judgment was entered. The trial court granted Berry’s reconsideration motion, reinstated the summary judgment, and awarded Berry $1,000, the minimum award under the Act.

Both parties appealed. Chade argued that its motion to vacate was timely because the partial summary judgment was not a final and appealable order. The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed, and stated there was nothing in the summary judgment ruling to indicate it was final and appealable (no Rule 304(a) language or the like), so it was no more than a typical non-final interlocutory order.

As the trial court noted, allowing the partial summary judgment to remain in place even after the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support her underlying claims yielded an inconsistent and irreconcilable result. If the defendant did not breach the contract or violate the Act, then clearly it could not be liable for damages. Yet, allowing the partial summary judgment to remain in place resulted in the trial court awarding statutory damages of $1,000, although no damages were due.

The appellate court clearly was frustrated with this case. The court found the trial court’s result “flies in the face of established legal principles.” Read the whole opinion, Berry v. Chade Fashions, No. 1-07-0639 (6/30/08), by clicking here.

After Ms. Easley lost her appeal in the 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, she moved for an en banc rehearing. But her petition did not follow Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, which requires a statement of one of two things: (1) that the opinion of the appellate court is in conflict with an opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court; or (2) that the appeal involves a question of “exceptional importance.”

Ms. Easley’s petition did neither, so the court considered it as a petition for rehearing by the original panel. But the motion only raised an issue that was not argued in the original appellate proceeding. Nor did it otherwise comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40, which governs panel rehearings. FRAP 40 requires a petition for rehearing to “state with particularity each point of law or fact that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended and must argue in support of the petition.”

The appellate court denied the petition for panel rehearing because: “It goes without saying that the panel cannot have ‘overlooked or misapprehended’ an issue that was not presented to it. Panel rehearing is not a vehicle for presenting new arguments, and, absent extraordinary
circumstances, we shall not entertain arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.”

All brief writers should read this opinion because it explicitly states the 7th Circuit’s expectations for rehearing petitions. Get the whole case, Easley v. Reuss, No. 06-1646 (7/3/08), by clicking here.

This case is another dispute between an insured and his homeowner’s insurer. After his house burned down, Rodney Barth filed a claim with State Farm. State Farm denied the claim because, it argued, Rodney made material misrepresentations during State Farm’s investigation of the fire. A jury found in favor of State Farm, and Rodney appealed.

Rodney argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury that State Farm was required to prove that it reasonably relied to its prejudice on Rodney’s misrepresentation. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury only that Rodney’s misrepresentation had to be “material.”

The Illinois Supreme Court stated the rule for review of jury instruction challenges: “Although jury instructions are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, our standard of review is de novo when the question is whether the applicable law was accurately conveyed.”

In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the jury only needed to be instructed as to “materiality,” and not on the elements reasonable reliance and prejudice.

Read the whole case, Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, No. 104378 (3/20/08, by ckicking here..

Jeffrey Woods and three associated parties had a dispute with the Patterson Law firm. The law firm claimed Woods et al. owed $47,000 for legal fees; Woods claimed the law firm committed legal malpractice. The law firm sued for the fees, but voluntarily dismissed its case. Woods then sued for malpractice.

In the malpractice case, the law firm raised an affirmative defense that its agreement with Woods required arbitration of “[a]ny controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to our fees, charges, performance of legal services …” But the firm also made two motions to dismiss the case, filed a demand for a bill of particulars, served interrogatories on plaintiff, and issued a subpoena for documents to a third-party.

After all that, the firm asked the court to compel arbitration of the dispute. The trial court ruled that the law firm waived its right to compel arbitration because it participated so heavily in Woods’s lawsuit. The law firm appealed the denial of its attempt to compel the arbitration.

The appeal was pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a), which permits interlocutory appeals as of right from an order granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction. The First District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that “a motion to compel arbitration is analogous to a motion for injunctive relief," and that the standard of review is “abuse of discretion.”

The appeal evoked three separate opinions from the three-judge panel. Two of the opinions agreed with the trial court so the waiver ruling was affirmed. One judge dissented.

The primary opinion discussed some of the policy considerations involved in waiver of a claim to arbitrate: “Illinois courts disfavor a finding of waiver … However, the right to compel arbitration of a dispute can be waived as with any other contractual right … Illinois courts will find waiver of a party's right to compel arbitration when a party's conduct is inconsistent with an arbitration clause, thus indicating an abandonment of the right to arbitration … Additionally, a party waives its right to arbitrate by submitting arbitrable issues to a court for decision … Illinois courts also consider the delay in a party's assertion of its right to arbitrate and any prejudice the delay caused the plaintiff …”

This opinion stated that overlooking waiver might result in heavier costs for the parties to resolve the dispute; parties would be motivated to take discovery in the lawsuit, to which they might not be entitled in the arbitration, then demand arbitration. All of that would defeat an important purpose of arbitration – saving the costs of litigation.

The dissent saw the more important policy as encouraging arbitration. The dissent also was concerned that “the plaintiffs are trying to slip out of their contractual duty to arbitrate. We should not let it happen. I believe the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration.”

Read the whole opinion, Woods v. Patterson Law Firm, No. 1-08-0066 (3/31/08), by clicking here. (The Public Law Library; free account required.)

As representative of Stanley Collins’s estate, Lisa Collins sued St. Paul Mercury Insurance for underinsured motorist coverage of the auto accident that killed Stanley. Lisa appealed after the trial court ruled that St. Paul did not owe insurance coverage and awarded the company summary judgment.

Among other things, Lisa complained that her affidavit supporting her opposition to summary judgment should not have been stricken. The First District Illinois Appellate Court identified the proper standard of review as de novo. “When a trial court rules on a motion to strike an affidavit in conjunction with a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court reviews that ruling de novo.”

In this case, the appellate court ruled it was proper to strike the affidavit because it “failed to comply with the requirements of [Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191] in that it contained unsupported assertions, opinions, and conclusions regarding plaintiff's ‘expectations’ about the St. Paul policy's coverage.” Read the whole case, Collins v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., No. 1-06-36-1 (3/25/08), by clicking here.

Eclipse Manufacturing apparently was annoyed by receiving unsolicited faxes from United States Compliance. So Eclipse filed a class action case against Compliance. Compliance demanded a defense and indemnification from its insurer, Hartford Insurance. Hartford declined to defend and denied coverage.

Compliance settled with Eclipse, and gave Eclipse an assignment of the Hartford insurance policy benefit. Eclipse proceeded on a third party citation to collect the Hartford policy limits. The trial court ruled that the Hartford insurance policy covered Eclipse’s claim against Compliance, and ordered Hartford to pay the settlement.

The trial court stated its intention to rule for Eclipse in July 2006, and directed Eclipse and Hartford to draft an order based on the court’s comments. But Eclipse and Hartford could not agree on language for the order. Just before 30 days from when the trial court stated it would rule for Eclipse, but before a written order was entered, Hartford filed its notice of appeal.

Hartford filed its appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1). The rule required an appeal to be filed within 30 days of a final judgment. But the trial court’s statement that it intended to rule for Eclipse was not a final judgment. So Hartford’s notice of appeal was premature, and did not invoke appellate jurisdiction.

But while Hartford’s appeal was pending, Rule 303(a)(1) was amended. The amendment allowed “[a] notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision, but before the entry of the judgment or order, … [to be] treated as filed on the date of and after the entry of the judgment or order.” So Hartford’s jurisdictional problem would be fixed if the amendment could be applied retroactively to Hartford’s appeal.

That’s exactly what the Second District Illinois Appellate Court did. “In the interest of consistency,” the court relied on its decision in In re Marriage of Duggan, 376 Ill.App.3d 725 (2007), which ruled that a similar amendment should be applied retroactively. Take a look at our report of the Duggan case here, here, and
here. And get the court’s entire opinion in Eclipse Manufacturing v. United States Compliance, Nos. 2-06-0825, 2-06-0889 (11/30/07), by clicking here.

Kevin S. disputed an involuntary commitment order against him that placed him in the Chester Mental Health Center. The commitment order was entered in November 2006, and was good for 180 days. But the case was before the Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court well after the 180 days expired. So appellate jurisdiction the first question the court addressed. Was the case moot because the commitment order had expired, and the appellate court no longer could give Kevin S. the relief he requested? If so, the appellate court would be without jurisdiction to rule on Kevin’s appeal.

The court ruled that the case fell into an exception to the mootness doctrine, and stated that it did have jurisdiction. “Generally, a court will not consider moot questions or render advisory decisions … Questions raised in an appeal that are capable of repetition, yet might evade review because of the short duration of the order, fall under the exception of the mootness doctrine … Given that respondent [Kevin S] has a long history of civil commitment and that it is likely that the circumstances present here may reoccur without the opportunity for a resolution before the case is rendered moot by the expiration of the order, we will address respondent's contentions.”

Read the whole case, In re Kevin S., No. 5-06-0677 (4/2/08), by clicking here.

A building owned by the Jesuit church collapsed during demolition of the building next door. The church’s insurer paid the church’s insurance claim, and they both sued a number of the contractors involved in the demolition. When the church and the insurer settled with most of the defendants, the non-settling defendants contested the good faith of the settlement.

The trial court ruled that the settlement was made in good faith, thus extinguishing the non-settling defendants’ claims for contribution against the settlors. The non-settlors then appealed the good faith finding. A number of hearings on the motion for good faith finding were held in the trial court, but transcripts of those hearings were not a part of the appellate record.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the good faith finding. The appellate ruling was made in part because the non-settlors failed to provide a record sufficient to find an abuse of discretion. Here is the appellate court’s rationale:

… [A] reviewing court’s starting point is the view voiced by the trial court … In the case at bar, we have no idea what view of the trial court voiced because the appellate record is missing numerous transcripts where the trial court may have voiced its view. At least half a dozen hearings took place concerning the good-faith motion prior to the trial court’s ruling … Instead of providing the transcripts in the record, appellants chose to spend several pages of their brief arguing to this court what the missing transcripts might have “possibly” said. This type of speculation has been explicitly forbidden by our supreme court.

So the lesson is: Get a court reporter and include the hearing transcript in the record. Read the whole case, The Chicago Province of the Society of Jesus v. Clark and Dickens, No. 1-07-0960, 1-07-1003 ( 6/9/08), by clicking here.

After his ex-wife died, Edward Trevino got into a dispute with his children over the disposition of a $100,000 life insurance benefit. Edward was the beneficiary on the policy. But his children pointed to a marital settlement agreement that stated they were to be beneficiaries of any “death benefits.”

The children’s guardian asked for a constructive trust over the life insurance benefit. After the trial court imposed a constructive trust, Edward appealed that order.

The first issue was the standard of review. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court distinguished between review of imposition of a constructive trust and of a marital settlement agreement. “At the outset, we note that, even though the order Edward challenges is one imposing the equitable remedy of a constructive trust … our review is de novo. Typically, the imposition of a constructive trust is a matter for the discretion of the trial court … Here, however, the issue is not whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a constructive trust, but whether the marital settlement agreement provided a legal basis for the trial court’s order. Edward has asked us to review only the trial court’s interpretation of the agreement. Our review of a court’s interpretation of a marital settlement agreement is de novo.”

The appellate court ruled that “death benefits,” as used in the marital settlement agreement, included the life insurance benefit, and affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust. Read the whole case, In re Estate of Trevino, No. 2007-0503 (4/7/08), by clicking here.

This case involves a dispute over the sale of land. Wheeler-Dealer asked the court to reform or rescind of the deed. Defendant Roger Christ won after a bench trial. Wheeler-Dealer appealed the verdict.

One of Wheeler-Dealer’s arguments to the First District Illinois Appellate Court was that parol evidence improperly was admitted at the trial. Wheeler-Dealer claimed that it objected to “the admission of any oral statements going to the intent of the parties at the time that they entered into the real estate contract and that it again objected to such evidence in its brief filed with the circuit court prior to the commencement of trial.”

Not good enough, according to the appellate court. The court ruled that the pretrial objections did not save the issue for appeal. “Timeliness requires that an objection be made when the evidence is offered at trial … Although a party may have objected to the evidence at some pre-trial stage in the proceedings or unsuccessfully moved to bar the evidence prior to trial, it must still renew its objection at the time that the evidence is offered … Failure to renew the objection when the evidence is offered at trial results in a waiver of any challenge to the circuit court's consideration of that evidence.”

The lesson bears repeating. To assure an evidentiary objection is preserved for appeal, no matter how many pre-trial objections were made, you should object to it at trial. Otherwise you risk waiving the objection in the appellate court.

Get the whole case, Wheeler-Dealer, Ltd. v. Christ, No. 1-07-0970 (3/4/08), by clicking here.