In re Marriage of Duggan offers good analysis by the Second District Illinois Appellate Court of two issues that have been confounding the appellate and family law bars. We’ll look at the case, and an interesting concurring opinion that disagrees with the majority on the appellate issues, in this and the next few entries.
The facts are not complicated. The Duggans’ marriage was dissolved in January 2002. In August 2005, Tamara petitioned for an increase in child support. Pursuant to an agreement, an order was entered stating that Darrell would pay a percentage of his net income.
Darrell then made a timely motion to vacate the order because it did not specify a particular dollar amount for the payment, as is required by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. At the same time, Darrell also filed a petition to establish specific visitation times.
In December 2005, the trial court ruled on Darrell’s motion to vacate, refusing to vacate the percentage award. The trial court did not make a Rule 304(a) finding. (No just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order.) Unhappy with the ruling, Darrell filed a Notice of Appeal within 30 days. When the Notice of Appeal was filed, the trial court still had not ruled on Darrell’s petition to set specific visitation times. That petition was resolved by a court order in May 2006.
The parties initially did not dispute appellate jurisdiction. But the court questioned whether it had the power to consider Darrell’s appeal of the percentage award. The first question was whether Darrell’s second petition −to set visitation times − was a claim within the same cause of action, or a whole new cause of action.
If it was a claim within the same action, then the order on the motion to vacate would require a Rule 304(a) finding in order to be appealable. Because there was not a Rule 304(a) finding, the appellate court would not have jurisdiction of Darrell’s appeal. If the petition to set visitation times constituted a new action, as Darrell argued, then Rule 304(a) language would not be necessary and the appellate court would have jurisdiction.
But the analysis was complicated by an amendment to an Illinois Supreme Court Rule that took effect while the appellate court was deliberating. Rule 303(a) was amended so “when a timely postjudgment motion has been filed, a notice of appeal filed before ‘the final disposition of any separate claim does not become effective until the order disposing of the separate claim is entered.’” This was exactly the situation in the Duggans’ case. So the first question was whether “amendments to Rule 303(a) should apply to all cases pending before the appellate court on the effective date, including this one (retroactive application) or only to those appeals filed after the effective date (prospective application).”
The appellate court concluded that the amendment to Rule 303(a) should apply retroactively. The keys to this decision were: (1) the amendment was procedural, not substantive, and (2) imposition of the amendment did not impair any rights that Tamara had.
The amendment was considered “procedural” because it “relate[d] solely to the manner in which an appeal of the final judgment on one claim in a multi-claim case may be heard.” That entails “the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress.” That is generally what Supreme Court Rules do − prescribe the method for advancing pending litigation.
Nor was retroactive application of amended Rule 303(a) unfair to Tamara − i.e, it did not impair a right she possessed. The court rejected the Concurrence’s position in this regard.
The special concurrence suggests that our ability to hear this appeal under the new Rule 303 (a) impairs Tamaara’s “right” to a dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If this is a “right” at all, however, it is not a right that Tamara ”possessed when she acted,” as she has taken to action in reliance on our initial lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, she did not even raise the issue of our jurisdiction until we required her to do so via supplemental briefing. This fact is not simply an accident of the parties” skill in recognizing jurisdictional defects; it highlights the nature of jurisdiction − it is not a right possessed by the parties, but a prerogative of the court that we assert and determine.
I appreciate the conclusion that Tamara did not have a “right” to dismissal of Darrell’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. But I do take exception to the conclusion that jurisdiction “is not a right possessed by the parties.” In fact, litigants are granted access to the courts, and thus the courts are given jurisdiction, by the Illinois Constitution. While the court gets to determine the contours of jurisdiction, it is not merely a “prerogative of the court.”
In any event, the court concluded that retroactive application of the Amended Rule 303(a) was appropriate. So Darrell won the first prong of the argument.
We’ll look at other aspects of the case in forthcoming entries. But you can get the whole opinion, IRMO Duggan, No. 2-06-0061 (10/16/07), by clicking here.