Articles Posted in Illinois Supreme Court Rules

Peggy Lee Hall claimed she was injured when she slipped on ice in a parking lot owned by Naper Gold Hospitality LLC. She sued Naper, but the company got summary judgment because Hall did not show facts that there had been an unnatural accumulation of ice.

Hall appealed Naper’s summary judgment. But the Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the appeal “because of the flagrant and, frankly, appalling violations of supreme court rules committed by plaintiff’s [Hall] attorney … and his law firm … in the handling of this appeal.”

These were Hall’s violations:

While their divorce case was pending, Robert and Cindy Andrews signed a listing agreement to sell their house. The real estate broker, VC&M, found a buyer. But the Andrewses rejected the offer, which was for less than their asking price. Instead, Cindy decided to stay in the house, so she agreed to purchase Robert’s half. As part of their marital settlement agreement, Robert transferred his interest to Cindy.

VC&M wanted a commission for introducing the prospective buyer, but the Andrewses refused to pay. So VC&M sued for breach of contract. The Andrewses asked the trial court to dismiss the complaint. VC&M filed an opposition memorandum electronically. Before VC&M’s e-filing, the parties had not stipulated to allow e-filings.

The trial court agreed that VC&M did not state a claim, so the complaint was dismissed. Thirty days later, in another electronic filing, VC&M asked the trial court to reconsider the dismissal. Another month later, VC&M filed a paper copy of its reconsideration request. Another month after that, VC&M e-filed a notice of appeal.

Anna Wiggen sold a painting to Brian and Kayla Roughton. At the time, Anna was married to Patricia Wiggens’s brother. After Anna and Patricia’s brother divorced, Patricia claimed (1) she was the owner of the painting, and (2) the painting was sold without her consent. Patricia demanded return of the painting, but the Roughtons refused to give it back. So Patricia, who lived in Illinois, sued the Roughtons, who lived in Texas, in an Illinois court.

The Roughtons asked the trial court to dismiss them from the lawsuit because, they claimed, they were not subject to personal jurisdiction by the Illinois court. The trial court first denied the Roughtons’s request to dismiss.

The Roughtons then asked the court to reconsider. They attached Anna’s affidavit to their request for reconsideration, which indicated the Roughtons had limited contacts with Illinois. The trial court ruled in favor of the Roughtons on the reconsideration try and dismissed them from the case.

This case involved John Crane, Inc.’s claim for insurance coverage, and the insurers’ counterclaim against Crane. The insurers persuaded the trial court to dismiss Crane’s complaint. Two days later, Crane appealed the dismissal.

Then CNA, one of the insurers, asked the trial court to vacate or modify the dismissal order and for leave to amend its counterclaim against Crane. The trial court ruled (1) against CNA and would not allow the judgment to be vacated or modified, (2) for CNA and allowed amendment of the counterclaim against Crane.

Two weeks later, the trial court entered a final judgment on all of the remaining claims except CNA’s counterclaim.

David Hammer was executor of Ronald Weeks’s estate. Hammer hired Thomas Brucker as an attorney to assist in the administration of the estate. Hammer ($120,000) and Brucker ($170,000) paid themselves based on a percentage of the estate’s value.

Weeks left one-fourth of his estate to a New York-based charity. The charity disputed whether Hammer and Brucker could properly take a percentage of the estate for their fees. The Illinois Attorney General intervened in the case, and disputed Hammer’s and Brucker’s fees. The trial court agreed with the Attorney General, drastically lowered the fees, and ordered Hammer and Brucker to return the excess to the estate.

Hammer and Brucker appealed. But their notice of appeal stated that the Estate of Weeks was the party appealing, not Hammer and not Brucker. The Attorney General argued that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the wrong party was identified as the appellant. The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the mistake on the notice of appeal was technical, and did not defeat appellate jurisdiction. Here’s how the appellate court explained the ruling.

Leon Aylward claimed his doctor, Michael Settecase, and the medical clinic that employed him, failed to timely diagnose Aylward’s lung cancer. After Aylward sued them for malpractice, the clinic asked the trial court for permission to talk to other clinic employees who had been involved with Aylward’s treatment, but had not been sued. The clinic argued it should be allowed to have private conversations with the employees because Aylward could sue them later, and as defendants the clinic’s lawyers could talk to them privately.

The trial court denied the request, but certified the question to allow an immediate appeal. The appellate court accepted the immediate appeal, but Aylward asked for it to be dismissed. He argued that it was not a proper interlocutory appeal because it called for an advisory opinion to a hypothetical question – i.e., it was hypothetical that the employees would be sued.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court disagreed because, “Answering this question will have an immediate effect upon the discovery process by determining whether MPG [clinic] is permitted to represent the MPG employees, and thus, its resolution may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

Illinois has adopted public-domain citation for all cases filed on or after July 1, 2011. The Illinois Supreme Court has amended its Rule 6, which now also requires pinpoint citation to an assigned paragraph number. Your memorandum or brief may contain a citation to West’s North Eastern Reporter or Illinois Decisions, but those citations will be neither required nor alone sufficient. The official reporter — which we’re accustomed to citing as “Ill. 2d” or “Ill. App. 3d” — is going extinct for cases filed after July 1st.

So what’s a Westlaw researcher to do? A Westlaw telephone researcher reported the company is working on paginating in accord with the public domain versions. No word yet on when the new pagination will be available on Westlaw.

According to the revised Rule 6 comments, here’s how the new supreme court cite should look: People v. Doe, 2011 IL 10234. A pinpoint cite to an appellate court opinion should look like this: People v. Doe, 2011 IL App (1st) 101234, ¶ 15. The “1st” parenthetical refers to the First District Appellate Court, so newly filed appellate opinions will require reference to one of the five appellate court districts. (I wonder why. The Illinois appellate courts are a unified system. Each opinion, no matter which district issues it, should have equal precedential value.)

Changes to the official method of case citation in Illinois go into effect next month. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules will require the court docket number to be cited, and does away with citation to an official printed reporter. Official Illinois supreme court and appellate court opinions will be on the courts’ website. Here is the supreme court’s press release on the changes.

Marc and Mary Simon bought a condominium from Palmolive Tower Condominium before Palmolive finished constructing the building. The Simons were unhappy with Palmolive’s performance, and refused to release the money being held in escrow for Palmolive. So Palmolive sued the Simons, and the Simons counterclaimed for breach of contract and fraud.

Palmolive asked the trial court for judgment on the pleadings on its own multi-count complaint, and to dismiss the Simons’s counterclaim. The trial court dismissed the counterclaims, and stated its order was “a final and appealable order there being no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.” Later the trial court gave judgment on the pleadings in favor of Palmolive on the first of several counts of its complaint. The remaining counts of Palmolive’s complaint were left standing. The court’s judgment said it was “final and appealable.”

The Simons appealed from both orders. The parties agreed the appellate court had jurisdiction over the order giving Palmolive judgment on the pleadings. But the court thought otherwise and dismissed that part of the Simons’s appeal. Here’s why.

This posting is not strictly about appellate practice, but it’s worthwhile to read here because it answers the question of how long you have after a final order is entered to ask the trial court for attorney fees. And how long do you have to request fees after the trial court allows an interlocutory appeal? These are questions trial attorneys ask me a lot.

Timothy and Michael Herlehy felt they were shortchanged in their great-aunt’s trust. When she died, the Herlehys sued the trustee, First National Bank of LaGrange, and five charities that were residuary beneficiaries of the trust. The claim against LaGrange Bank was for breach of fiduciary duty in administering the trust. The Herlehys felt the charities received more money than they were entitled to, so the claim against the charities was for unjust enrichment.

The trial court dismissed the complaint against LaGrange Bank because it did not have a duty to change the trust in keeping with the Herlehys’ wishes. After it won, the bank asked for an award of its attorney fees, but the trial court denied that request because, it said, it did not have jurisdiction to consider the question.