Kenneth Stark and Vesta Stark, both elderly, were married. Vesta suffered from Alzheimers disease. Kenneth died and left substantial money to the Southern Illinois University Foundation and the Shriner’s Hospital for Children. The will left nothing to Vesta, but did contain a statement that “adequate and suitable” provisions were made for Vesta from resources outside of the assets identified in the will. And the facts did show that Vesta was well taken care of.
Vesta gave power of attorney to her son, Mark. On Vesta’s behalf, Mark filed a renunciation of Kenneth’s will. By renouncing the will, Vesta stood to take a one-half share of Kenneth’s estate, more than $2.3 million.
SIU and Shriner’s petitioned to vacate the renunciation. The parties moved for partial summary judgment. SIU and Shriner’s argued that Mark did not act “for the benefit of” Vesta in renouncing the will, as is required by the Illinois Power of Attorney Act. Mark argued the opposite.
Mark’s summary judgment motion was granted “on the assumption that the power of attorney was valid.” The trial court reserved for further proceedings the question of whether Vesta was competent when she gave power of attorney to Mark. The trial court also ruled that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the summary judgment rulings, thus allowing for an interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a).
The parties did not question appellate jurisdiction, but the appellate court raised the question of the propriety of the interlocutory appeal on its own. The opinion analyzes when there really is “no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal” of an interlocutory order.
In this case, the appellate court stated it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow an interlocutory appeal. The court stated that the will renunciation was conditioned on the existence of a properly executed power of attorney, and the propriety of the power of attorney was conditioned upon Vesta’s competence when she signed. “Were the power of attorney to be held invalid, the question of whether a renunciation would have been for the benefit of Vesta would be moot, making a resolution on the merits of this instant appeal purely advisory.”