Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

September 15, 2012

Death Of Fireman’s Widow Does Not Moot Her Appeal Of Retroactive Annuity Benefits

Michael Hooker suffered a debilitating injury while working for the Chicago Fire Department. After he died two years later, his widow, Elaine, applied to the Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund for widow’s benefits. She was awarded a minimum annuity, but she felt the Board did not include all of the money she was entitled to when calculating the amount of the annuity.

The original case went to the appellate court and then back to the trial court. Elaine filed an amended complaint that asked for recalculation of the annuity based upon an Illinois statute that became law after she filed the first complaint. She argued she was entitled to certain retroactive benefits.

The trial court gave summary judgment to the Board on its method of calculating the annuity. Elaine appealed. She died after the appeal was filed, but her estate carried on the appeal.

September 7, 2012

One Notice Of Appeal Gives Appellate Jurisdiction Over 32 Plaintiff Appeals in Truck-Train Collision Case

by Steven R. Merican

A proliferation of lawsuits was filed after a collision between a truck carrying a load of metal rebar and an Amtrak passenger train. A number of passengers were injured, and some died in the accident. Cases by 32 passengers or their representatives were filed in Illinois state court. Debra Dowe’s lawsuit was among them. Dowe sued a number of parties, including Birmingham Steel, the rebar manufacturer that allegedly loaded the truck that was in the accident. Dowe’s lawsuit was consolidated with the others for purposes of pretrial discovery and motions.

Birmingham asked for, and received, summary judgment against Dowe and the other 31 parties. Dowe then appealed the summary judgment given to Birmingham. Her Notice of Appeal was filed for her own case and the 31 other plaintiffs whose cases were consolidated.

But Birmingham argued that the 31 others had to file their own appeals. Birmingham claimed that each of the non-Dowe lawsuits retained their own identity despite the consolidation for pre-trial purposes. Because the 31 non-Dowe plaintiffs had not filed their own notices of appeal, Birmingham argued, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider their appeals.

September 5, 2012

Tax Preparer Waives Choice-Of-Law Argument In NonCompete Clause Appeal

by Steven R. Merican

Zabaneh Franchises bought an H&R Block tax preparation franchise. The purchase included “all interest in the employment and noncompetition agreements with H&R Block’s employees.”

Terri Walker had been employed by H&R, but claimed she did not have an employment agreement with Zabaneh. Zabaneh claimed the Terri violated the employment agreement she signed with H&R, and that Zabaneh took over, because within a few months after leaving H&R, Terri (1) started her own tax preparation business; (2) hired H&R employees; (3) solicited H&R customers. So Zabaneh asked the trial court for a preliminary injunction to prevent Terri from doing all those things.

The trial court denied Zabaneh’s request for an injunction against Terri. The trial court refused to enforce the employment contract because it was a “contract of adhesion,” meaning there had not been negotiation of the terms of the contract and the only way Terri could get employment with H&R was to accept the contract as presented. So Zabaneh appealed.

July 30, 2012

Continuing Confusion About Appellate Jurisdiction In Illinois Post-Dissolution Divorce Proceedings

by Steven R. Merican

Elizabeth Demaret got a better job in New Jersey, so she wanted to move there from Illinois with her children. She had sole custody of her four children. James, her ex-husband, had parenting time in accord with a parenting agreement that an Illinois trial court incorporated into the divorce judgment.

Elizabeth asked the trial court for permission to move the children to New Jersey. James fought the request because he felt his time with the children would suffer and diminish. He asked the trial court to award him attorney fees he would incur fighting Elizabeth’s removal request.

The trial court denied Elizabeth’s request to move the children to New Jersey. Elizabeth appealed, but James’s fee request still was pending in the trial court. James argued that was enough to deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the appeal ― that is, (1) no appellate jurisdiction because (2) the order denying Elizabeth’s request to move the children was not final and appealable because (3) James’s fee petition still was pending in the trial court.

July 21, 2012

Refusal To Modify Divorce Judgment Not Appealable Because Of Other Pending Issues

by Steven R. Merican

Arthur and Shirley Susman got divorced. The divorce judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement, which reserved two subjects to be resolved later: (1) certain tax liabilities, and (2) allocation of certain personal property.

A few months later, Arthur asked the trial court to modify the judgment. He claimed there had been a mutual mistake of fact regarding a different tax liability. The trial court denied Arthur’s request.

Arthur appealed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301, which allows appeals from final judgments. But the First District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Arthur’s appeal. The appellate court ruled that Arthur’s appeal of the order denying his request to modify the judgment was not appealable because other questions had been reserved by the trial court. Here’s how the appellate court explained it:

July 15, 2012

Injured Party’s Appeal Dismissed For Violations Of Appellate Brief-Writing Rules

by Steven R. Merican

Peggy Lee Hall claimed she was injured when she slipped on ice in a parking lot owned by Naper Gold Hospitality LLC. She sued Naper, but the company got summary judgment because Hall did not show facts that there had been an unnatural accumulation of ice.

Hall appealed Naper’s summary judgment. But the Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the appeal “because of the flagrant and, frankly, appalling violations of supreme court rules committed by plaintiff’s [Hall] attorney … and his law firm … in the handling of this appeal.”

These were Hall’s violations:

May 20, 2012

Father Successfully Appeals Termination Of Parental Rights

by Steven R. Merican

Ralph L’s baby, Haley, was born with a cocaine addiction. When Haley was released from the hospital, the State of Illinois took her into protective custody and placed her with foster parents. The State also filed a lawsuit asking that Haley be made a ward of the court. The State did not at that time ask the trial court to terminate Ralph’s parental rights.

The trial court soon made Haley a ward of the court. A goal was set to return Haley to Ralph in 12 months, if Ralph were able to meet certain conditions. Ralph did not meet two of the conditions: submission to random drug testing and completion of domestic violence and mental health assessments.

So the trial court allowed the State to file a petition to terminate Ralph’s parental rights. Four months later the State did so. But Ralph had not been given personal service of the State’s petition. The trial court proceeded with the termination hearing anyway, even though Ralph was not there and service had been accomplished only by publication. The State asked for, and received, an order of default against Ralph.

April 30, 2012

Emergency Worker’s Late Appeal Against Hospital Dismissed

by Steven R. Merican

Edward Dus, an ambulance driver, injured his knee when he was moving a patient at the emergency room at Provena St. Mary’s Hospital. He claimed he was injured by a laundry cart being pushed by a Provena employee. Dus sued Provena. A jury awarded Dus $300,000, which was cut in half because he also was found to be 50 percent at fault for the accident.

Within 30 days, Dus asked the trial court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the question of his contributory negligence. But when his lawyer did not appear for the hearing, the trial court denied Dus’s request. Two days later, Dus asked the trial court to reconsider the denial. The trial court allowed Dus to refile the original request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Dus refiled, but three months later the trial court denied Dus’s request.

Dus appealed. Provena asked the appellate court to dismiss the appeal because, the hospital argued, Dus filed the appeal too late, more than 30 days after the first time the trial court denied his original motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Dus argued the time to file was tolled until 30 days after the trial court ruled on his request for reconsideration, which would have made his appeal timely.

April 20, 2012

Real Estate Broker’s Appeal Dismissed For Lack Of Compliance With Local E-Filing Rules

by Steven R. Merican

While their divorce case was pending, Robert and Cindy Andrews signed a listing agreement to sell their house. The real estate broker, VC&M, found a buyer. But the Andrewses rejected the offer, which was for less than their asking price. Instead, Cindy decided to stay in the house, so she agreed to purchase Robert’s half. As part of their marital settlement agreement, Robert transferred his interest to Cindy.

VC&M wanted a commission for introducing the prospective buyer, but the Andrewses refused to pay. So VC&M sued for breach of contract. The Andrewses asked the trial court to dismiss the complaint. VC&M filed an opposition memorandum electronically. Before VC&M’s e-filing, the parties had not stipulated to allow e-filings.

The trial court agreed that VC&M did not state a claim, so the complaint was dismissed. Thirty days later, in another electronic filing, VC&M asked the trial court to reconsider the dismissal. Another month later, VC&M filed a paper copy of its reconsideration request. Another month after that, VC&M e-filed a notice of appeal.

April 7, 2012

Appellate Jurisdiction Okay Despite Incomplete Notice Of Appeal

by Steven R. Merican

Diane Borchers was the food service director at Mayslake Village, a senior citizen housing facility. Borchers used the company email system to communicate with vendors and other Mayslake employees. While she was on disability leave, two Mayslake employees accessed some of Borchers’s personal emails. The emails were in Borchers’s personal email account, which was available on her company computer at the company’s office.

Borchers sued Mayslake for violation of the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the state commonlaw tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Later she sued the two Mayslake employees who got the emails.

Mayslake asked for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court ruled that Borchers did not have enough evidence that Mayslake acted intentionally in accessing the private emails to proceed with the lawsuit.