Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

The Dunns sued Lawrence Patterson, their lawyer, claiming estate documents Patterson drafted contained certain provisions that were void because they were against public policy. After the Dunns won a declaratory judgment in the trial court, Patterson appealed.

The Dunns argued that Patterson did not have standing to appeal the declaratory judgment. The Third District Illinois Appellate Court made short work of the argument. The court politely found “this contention to be inconsistent with the fact that plaintiffs named Patterson as the defendant in this suit and obtained a judgment against him.” The appellate court stated the “entry of a judgment itself constitutes legally cognizable damages,” which was sufficient to establish standing.

I can’t say it is a singular example, but I do not recall reading about a plaintiff arguing that a party he sued did not have standing. Patterson got a reversal of the judgment, too. Read the whole case, Dunn v. Patterson, Nos. 3-07-0881, 3-08-0350 (11/18/09), by clicking here.

Richard Henry, then 89 years old, signed a will in 2004 that overrode all of his previous wills and codicils. The 2004 will left a substantial part of Henry’s estate to Peter Wemple and Mick Zawierucha. Henry’s prior will did not. Wemple was named executor of the 2004 will; Zawierucha was Henry’s caretaker.

About two years later, an Illinois trial court ruled that Henry was disabled, and J.P Morgan Chase Bank was named executor of Henry’s estate. The bank claimed that the 2004 will was procured through Zawierucha’s undue influence, so it asked the trial court for permission to change the terms of the document to reflect Henry’s last-known wishes.

Wemple and Zawierucha objected, but the trial court granted the bank’s request. Wemple and Zawierucha appealed. The bank then asked the appellate court to dismiss the appeal because, it argued, neither Wemple nor Zawierucha had standing to bring the appeal.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the bank and dismissed the appeal. Wemple and Zawierucha did not have standing because, as yet, they did not have a legally protectable interest in the 2004 will. This is how the appellate court explained the ruling.

[A] will confers no rights upon a legatee until the death of the testator …

Consequently, the dispository provisions of the 2004 will cannot provide standing for appellants: since appellants enjoyed no vested rights under the 2004 will, they cannot claim any injury in fact from the granting of the estate's petition. Our adjudication of this appeal would not result in an "immediate and definitive determination" of appellants' [Wemple and Zawierucha] rights, as is required for standing …

The appellate court stated that Wemple’s and Zawierucha’s recourse would be to file a will contest at the proper time. Read the whole opinion, In re Estate of Henry, Nos. 1-08-3398, 1-08-3479 (10/16/09), by clicking here.

This lawsuit grows from a political fight in Knox County, Illinois. After he took office as Knox County State’s Attorney, John Pepmeyer began an investigation into “improprieties” by current and former county employees of the county state’s attorney’s and sheriff’s offices. Two Assistant State’s Attorneys, Dean Stone and Michael Kraycinovich, were targets of Pepmeyer’s investigation. Stone and Kraycinovich in turn started their own investigation of Pepmeyer concerning allegations that he was guilty of sexual harassment.

Stone and Kraycinovich asked the trial court for appointment of a special counsel for their investigation into Pepmeyer. Pepmeyer asked the court for a special prosecutor for his investigation into Stone and Kraycinovich. The trial court appointed the Illinois Attorney General as special prosecutor of both investigations.

The trial court later modified the appointments. The Attorney General was left to investigate Pepmeyer. A former State’s Attorney for another county, William Poncin, was named special prosecutor to investigate “other Knox County public officials,” including Stone and Kraycinovich.

Pepmeyer appealed. He claimed that Poncin’s powers were too broad and infringed on Pepmeyer’ authority. While the appeal was pending, the Attorney General found there was no basis to investigate Pepmeyer − so the trial court terminated the Attorney General’s appointment.

Further complicating the case, Pepmeyer and Poncin brought the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor into the act. All three reached an agreement to divide their investigatory powers. Pepmeyer and Poncin then asked the appellate court for a “conditional remand” to direct the trial court to issue an order in accord with the agreement among Pepmeyer, Poncin, and the Appellate Prosecutor.

Stone and Kraycinovich objected to Pepmeyer’s and Poncin’s request. In response, Pepmeyer argued that Stone and Kraycinovich did not have standing in the appellate court to raise an objection or to participate in the appeal. Pepmeyer’s theory was that Stone and Kraycinovich lost standing when the trial court terminated the Attorney General’s appointment to investigate Pepmeyer.

The Third District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that Stone and Kraycinovich did not have standing in the appellate court “because they have failed to show an injury to a legally cognizable interest.” Nor did they have a sufficient “direct, immediate, and substantial interest in the subject matter” to give them standing as non-parties under the Illinois Supreme Court Rules.

The appellate court also denied Pepmeyer’s request for conditional remand “because a remand to the circuit court with directions to enter the proposed order would amount to an exercise of supervisory authority, which the appellate court lacks.”

Read the entire case, In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, No. 3-07-0553 (1/29/09), by clicking here.

Z.L., a minor who had been adopted as an infant, had reactive attachment disorder. The disorder apparently did not manifest until a few years after his adoption, when Z.L. became disruptive in the household.

The State filed a petition to adjudicate wardship, with the intent to place Z.L. in a foster home. Although they were designated as respondents to the the State’s petition, Z.L.’s parents agreed with the State and the petition. Only Z.L.’s Guardian Ad Litem opposed the State’s petition.

The trial court ruled that good cause did not exist to grant the State’s petition. Z.L.’s parents appealed the trial court’s decision. The State did not appeal, although it did file a brief supporting Z.L.’s parents. And while the GAL was named as an appellee, the GAL did not file an opposing brief.

The first question for the appellate court was whether Z.L.’s parents were proper parties to bring the appeal. The Fourth District Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that Z.L.’s parents could appeal, even though technically they were respondents to the petition in the trial court. “While the trial court's ruling meant Jeff and Emily retained their parental rights, the ruling in this case was adverse to their interests insomuch as they were seeking the trial court's permission to voluntarily relinquish those rights. Because the parents were parties to the proceedings in the trial court, had a substantial interest in the outcome of those proceedings, and that outcome was adverse to their interests, they have the right to pursue this appeal.”

The next issue was whether the parents should win by default because the GAL, the only party who opposed placing Z.L. in a foster home, did not file a brief. The Fourth District Appellate Court ruled that the absence of the GAL’s brief did not give Z.L.’s parents an “automatic” win. The court is not “compelled to serve as an advocate for an appellee,” nor “required to search the record for the purpose of sustaining the judgment of the trial court.”

But the court stated that it “may decide the merits of appellant's arguments on appeal where the record is simple, the claimed errors are such that they may be decided based on appellant's brief, and the record supports our finding in favor of appellant.” In this case, “Because respondents' and the State's briefs sufficiently present the issue for review, we will decide the merits of this appeal from the facts and legal arguments before us without the aid of a brief from the GAL.”

Ultimately, the appellate court ruled that Z.L.’s parents had good cause to be relieved of parental responsibilities. The whole case, In re Z.L., No. 4-06-0998 (2/15/08), is available by clicking here.

This wrongful death and survival action was filed on behalf of the estate of Rashidi Walker. Rashidi died during football practice at Northwestern University. His mother, Linda, and his father, George Wheeler, Jr., were coadministrators of Rashidi’s estate.

After lengthy litigation, the trial court approved a settlement of $16 million. Linda appealed the settlement approval. Although she sued only as administrator of Rashidi’s estate, she appealed as administrator and individually as an heir of the estate. Northwestern and George Jr. objected to Linda’s standing to appeal as an individual.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court sided with George Jr. and Northwestern. The court ruled that Linda did not have standing to appeal as an individual. Only the administrators of the estate were allowed to sue in the first place. The appellate court stated: “[I]f they [Linda and two other members of Rashidi’s estate who appealed as individuals] in their individual capacities were not parties to the underlying cause, they in their individual capacities cannot be parties to the instant appeal. Therefore, we find that they do not have standing and we dismiss their appeals.”

Northwestern also argued that Linda waived her right to appeal as coadministrator when she asked the trial court, as an alternative to setting aside the settlement, to compel payment of the settlement plus interest. But the appellate court disagreed, and stated that Linda was properly acting on behalf of the estate, and thus could appeal. “In her coadministrative capacity, Linda, through her motion, was exercising her fiduciary duties to insure that Rashidi's estate would be protected pending her attempts at appeal, i.e., that Northwestern would be made to pay the money it owed as agreed in the settlement and as ordered by the court and that interest would accrue thereon for the Estate's beneficiaries were she to be unsuccessful in future challenges to the validity of the settlement.”

The whole case, Will v. Northwestern University, Nos. 1-06-1566, 1-06-1642, 1-06-1643 (12/14/07), is available by clicking here.

The parties reached a settlement of a Fair Housing Act claim that was filed in federal court in Illinois. But then the parties could not agree on the terms of the agreement, so cross motions to enforce an agreement were filed. The district court granted defendant’s motion, denied plaintiff’s motion, and criticized plaintiff and her attorney for not being honest about the settlement.

When the settlement was brought to the Surrogate Court in New York for a determination that plaintiff’s children were fairly represented, plaintiff said that none of the settlement was attributable to her children. That was contrary to the original settlement agreement.

Back in Illinois, the federal district court concluded that plaintiff and her attorneys made improper representations to the defendants and to the Surrogate Court. The district court then entered a new settlement agreement, which attributed part of the money to plaintiff’s children.

Plaintiff’s attorney’s fee was a percentage of the settlement attributable to plaintiff, but not plaintiff’s children. So plaintiff’s attorney, on her own behalf, by way of a Rule 72 objection, contested the agreement. After the Rule 72 motion was denied, plaintiff’s attorney filed her own appeal. The appeal sought to overturn the settlement agreement and the orders that were critical of her conduct.

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal because the district court “has not imposed a monetary sanction on Ms. Matlaw [plaintiff’s attorney] in this case and therefore she cannot base her appeal on the alleged damage to her professional reputation regardless of how harmful Judge Cole’s comments might have been.” The appellate court ruled that where there is no monetary sanction, the attorney does not have standing to appeal. The court acknowledged a split of authority among the federal circuits, but stated: The limitation on our jurisdiction is based on the realization that allowing appeals by those allegedly harmed by a judge’s comments, including ‘[l]awyers, witnesses, victorious parties, victims, [and] bystanders,’ would result in a ‘breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction.’”

The entire case, Seymour v. Hug, No. 06-2502 (5/3/07), is available through Findlaw (free subscription). You also can access it through Westlaw, 2007 WL 1287513 (subscription required).