Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

Z.L., a minor who had been adopted as an infant, had reactive attachment disorder. The disorder apparently did not manifest until a few years after his adoption, when Z.L. became disruptive in the household.

The State filed a petition to adjudicate wardship, with the intent to place Z.L. in a foster home. Although they were designated as respondents to the the State’s petition, Z.L.’s parents agreed with the State and the petition. Only Z.L.’s Guardian Ad Litem opposed the State’s petition.

The trial court ruled that good cause did not exist to grant the State’s petition. Z.L.’s parents appealed the trial court’s decision. The State did not appeal, although it did file a brief supporting Z.L.’s parents. And while the GAL was named as an appellee, the GAL did not file an opposing brief.

The first question for the appellate court was whether Z.L.’s parents were proper parties to bring the appeal. The Fourth District Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that Z.L.’s parents could appeal, even though technically they were respondents to the petition in the trial court. “While the trial court's ruling meant Jeff and Emily retained their parental rights, the ruling in this case was adverse to their interests insomuch as they were seeking the trial court's permission to voluntarily relinquish those rights. Because the parents were parties to the proceedings in the trial court, had a substantial interest in the outcome of those proceedings, and that outcome was adverse to their interests, they have the right to pursue this appeal.”

The next issue was whether the parents should win by default because the GAL, the only party who opposed placing Z.L. in a foster home, did not file a brief. The Fourth District Appellate Court ruled that the absence of the GAL’s brief did not give Z.L.’s parents an “automatic” win. The court is not “compelled to serve as an advocate for an appellee,” nor “required to search the record for the purpose of sustaining the judgment of the trial court.”

But the court stated that it “may decide the merits of appellant's arguments on appeal where the record is simple, the claimed errors are such that they may be decided based on appellant's brief, and the record supports our finding in favor of appellant.” In this case, “Because respondents' and the State's briefs sufficiently present the issue for review, we will decide the merits of this appeal from the facts and legal arguments before us without the aid of a brief from the GAL.”

Ultimately, the appellate court ruled that Z.L.’s parents had good cause to be relieved of parental responsibilities. The whole case, In re Z.L., No. 4-06-0998 (2/15/08), is available by clicking here.

This wrongful death and survival action was filed on behalf of the estate of Rashidi Walker. Rashidi died during football practice at Northwestern University. His mother, Linda, and his father, George Wheeler, Jr., were coadministrators of Rashidi’s estate.

After lengthy litigation, the trial court approved a settlement of $16 million. Linda appealed the settlement approval. Although she sued only as administrator of Rashidi’s estate, she appealed as administrator and individually as an heir of the estate. Northwestern and George Jr. objected to Linda’s standing to appeal as an individual.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court sided with George Jr. and Northwestern. The court ruled that Linda did not have standing to appeal as an individual. Only the administrators of the estate were allowed to sue in the first place. The appellate court stated: “[I]f they [Linda and two other members of Rashidi’s estate who appealed as individuals] in their individual capacities were not parties to the underlying cause, they in their individual capacities cannot be parties to the instant appeal. Therefore, we find that they do not have standing and we dismiss their appeals.”

Northwestern also argued that Linda waived her right to appeal as coadministrator when she asked the trial court, as an alternative to setting aside the settlement, to compel payment of the settlement plus interest. But the appellate court disagreed, and stated that Linda was properly acting on behalf of the estate, and thus could appeal. “In her coadministrative capacity, Linda, through her motion, was exercising her fiduciary duties to insure that Rashidi's estate would be protected pending her attempts at appeal, i.e., that Northwestern would be made to pay the money it owed as agreed in the settlement and as ordered by the court and that interest would accrue thereon for the Estate's beneficiaries were she to be unsuccessful in future challenges to the validity of the settlement.”

The whole case, Will v. Northwestern University, Nos. 1-06-1566, 1-06-1642, 1-06-1643 (12/14/07), is available by clicking here.

The parties reached a settlement of a Fair Housing Act claim that was filed in federal court in Illinois. But then the parties could not agree on the terms of the agreement, so cross motions to enforce an agreement were filed. The district court granted defendant’s motion, denied plaintiff’s motion, and criticized plaintiff and her attorney for not being honest about the settlement.

When the settlement was brought to the Surrogate Court in New York for a determination that plaintiff’s children were fairly represented, plaintiff said that none of the settlement was attributable to her children. That was contrary to the original settlement agreement.

Back in Illinois, the federal district court concluded that plaintiff and her attorneys made improper representations to the defendants and to the Surrogate Court. The district court then entered a new settlement agreement, which attributed part of the money to plaintiff’s children.

Plaintiff’s attorney’s fee was a percentage of the settlement attributable to plaintiff, but not plaintiff’s children. So plaintiff’s attorney, on her own behalf, by way of a Rule 72 objection, contested the agreement. After the Rule 72 motion was denied, plaintiff’s attorney filed her own appeal. The appeal sought to overturn the settlement agreement and the orders that were critical of her conduct.

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal because the district court “has not imposed a monetary sanction on Ms. Matlaw [plaintiff’s attorney] in this case and therefore she cannot base her appeal on the alleged damage to her professional reputation regardless of how harmful Judge Cole’s comments might have been.” The appellate court ruled that where there is no monetary sanction, the attorney does not have standing to appeal. The court acknowledged a split of authority among the federal circuits, but stated: The limitation on our jurisdiction is based on the realization that allowing appeals by those allegedly harmed by a judge’s comments, including ‘[l]awyers, witnesses, victorious parties, victims, [and] bystanders,’ would result in a ‘breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction.’”

The entire case, Seymour v. Hug, No. 06-2502 (5/3/07), is available through Findlaw (free subscription). You also can access it through Westlaw, 2007 WL 1287513 (subscription required).