Articles Posted in Constitutional Analysis

Which deadline for filing a Notice of Appeal applies when the supreme court rules differ from the General Assembly’s statute? And what happens to the appeal when the Notice of Appeal meets the General Assembly’s deadline but not the supreme court’s?

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the General Assembly’s deadline applies.

In People v Illinois Commerce Commission, 2014 IL 116642 (11/20/14), the State of Illinois appealed an adverse ruling in a financial reconciliation matter that was filed under the Illinois Public Utilities Act. The Act allows 35 days to file an appeal; the Illinois Supreme Court Rules permits 30 days. The State met the General Assembly’s 35-day deadline, but missed the 30-day deadline.

The Illinois Supreme Court’s single-paragraph opinion in Keating v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL 116054 (11/20/14), is remarkable because the court was unable to render a decision.

The case involved the validity of Chicago’s red-light camera program [registered owner ticketed if the vehicle is photographed violating a red-light signal]. The First District Illinois Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of the case (2013 IL App (1st) 112559-U, a Rule 23 non-precedential opinion) deferring to Chicago’s home-rule authority.

Several people who were ticketed and who paid the fines appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. Two of the seven supreme court judges recused themselves from the case. (We don’t know why because they don’t tell us.)

Witte Brothers is an intersate trucking company. After an audit, under protest, Witte paid Illinois for “pass-through” miles [distance driven in Illinois without picking up or delivering goods].

Witte sued Illinois for reimbursement of the taxes. The trial court ruled that the Illinois Income Tax Act did not allow the State to tax truckers pass-through miles. So Illinois appealed.

Among other things, Witte argued in the appellate court that taxing pass-through miles violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But Witte did not raise this argument in the trial court, nor allege it as a separate count in its complaint. So the First District Illinois Appellate Court refused to consider the argument.

Donald Cookson sued Todd Price, a physical therapy assistant, and the Institute for Physical Medicine, Price’s employer, for medical malpractice. As required by an Illinois statute, Cookson filed an affidavit and a report by a physician swearing to Price’s malpractice. But Price claimed the affidavit did not comply with the statute because it was signed by a physician specializing in physical medicine, not a physical therapy assistant. So Price asked the trial court to dismiss the complaint.

Cookson first opposed Price’s dismissal request. But then deferring to Price’s argument, Cookson asked the trial court to allow him to file a new affidavit, this time signed by a physical therapy assistant. Price opposed the new affidavit because, he argued, it was offered more than 90 days after the complaint was filed, a violation of the Illinois statute.

The trial court agreed with Price and dismissed the lawsuit. But the appellate court reversed, ruling that the trial court had power to allow Cookson to file an amended complaint with a new affidavit, even more than 90 days after the case had been filed.

Robert Stein and Clinton Krislov both are attorneys. Stein sued Krislov and his lawfirm for libel. The alleged libelous statements were made in a letter Krislov wrote to a federal judge who was presiding over a class action case. Krislov’s letter stated that Stein misrepresented to the court his experience as class counsel.

Krislov asked the trial court to dismiss Stein’s libel case. Among other things, Krislov asserted immunity from Stein’s lawsuit based on the Citizen Partcipation Act. The Act gives immunity to a person who was sued as a result of exercising his rights to free speech and to participation in government.

The trial court denied Krislov’s request to dismiss. Krislov appealed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (appeal as of right from an interlocutory injunction) and the Act. The First District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Krislov’s appeal. The appellate court stated (1) the denial of Krislov’s request to dismiss did not qualify for appeal under Rule 307; (2) the Act could not provide appellate jurisdiction where the Illinois Supreme Court had not.

Louis Mund sued the Browns and the Furkins for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Browns and the Furkins asked the trial court to dismiss the case. They argued that the Illinois Citizen Participation Act (statute that “aims to protect defendants from ‘Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation’ (SLAPPs), which harass citizens for exercising constitutional rights, such as the right to petition the government.”) The trial court denied the request to dismiss the case, so the Browns and the Furkins appealed.

The Browns and the Furkins argued that the Citizen Participation Act expressly allowed an appeal “from a trial court order denying” a motion to dismiss. But the Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court refused to recognize that part of the statute, and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The appellate court ruled that the legislative attempt to make the order immediately appealable conflicted with the Illinois Constitution in two respects:

• First, the constitution allows only final orders to be appealed, and permits only the Illinois Supreme Court to make rules for appeal of interlocutory orders.

Flying J Inc. bought 50 acres of land in New Haven, Indiana intending to develop a travel plaza, hotel, and restaurant complex. But New Haven didn’t want the development and twice denied zoning variances. Flying J sued in Indiana state court, lost in the trial court, then won in the appellate court.

Undeterred, New Haven amended its zoning ordinance to limit developments like Flying J’s travel plaza to two acres. Flying J sued again, this time in federal district court. Flying J charged that its rights to equal protection and due process had been violated by New Haven’s actions in amending the zoning ordinance.

New Haven asked the federal district court to dismiss the case because, the city argued, (1) it was not ripe for decision, so the court did not have jurisdiction to hear it, and (2) the complaint did not state a cause of action. The ripeness argument was based on a U.S. Supreme Court case that ruled an aggrieved landowner must seek remedies in appropriate local agencies and courts before suing in federal court. In this case, because Flying J did not ask the New Haven Plan Commission for a zoning variance, New Haven argued, Flying J’s federal lawsuit was not ripe. The district court disagreed, and ruled that Flying J’s claim was ripe, so jurisdiction was proper. But the court then dismissed Flying J’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Ahmad Khorrami claimed he was wrongfully detained and mistreated by the federal government in an investigation stemming from the 9/11 terrorist attack. Khorrami sued Michael Rolince, an FBI agent on whose affidavit Khorrami allegedly was detained, and the government. The lawsuit alleged multiple causes of action, including one against Rolince — Khorrami claimed Rolince’s affidavit was false — for violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights.

The government moved to dismiss the complaint (1) for failure to state a claim and (2) arguing that Rolince had qualified immunity for his affidavit. The trial court granted all aspects of the motion, except that it declined to rule on the government’s claim for qualified immunity. The government brought an interlocutory appeal, arguing there was qualified immunity and that the whole case should have been dismissed.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. Because the immunity defense was postponed for later ruling by trial court, and not specifically ruled upon, there was not an order rejecting the immunity defense, which was a requirement for appeal. In addition, this was not a de facto denial of the immunity defense caused by a delay in ruling. The order setting aside the immunity ruling did not have a direct or irreparable impact on the merits of the case.

At the November 2008 election, Illinois voters will get a once every 20 years chance to vote on whether they want to have a state constitutional convention. The question will be debated by pundit Bruno Behrend (proponent) and lawyer Al Salvi (opponent) on July 29,2008 at 6:00 p.m. Central Time. The debate will be broadcast live on WKRS 1220-AM. If you’re in the area, and you’d rather be there for it, the debate will be held at Austin’s Saloon & Eatery, 481 Peterson Rd., Libertyville, Illinois. The debate also will stream live at www.wkrs.com, and will be podcast later. Call-ins (847-336-1220) will be welcomed.

A most interesting appellate law blogger’s opinion piece that ran in the Chicago Daily Observer for why Illinois voters should vote in favor of a constitutional convention is available right here. And for historical perspective, listen to our podcast interview of Ann Lousin, a researcher at the 1968 constitutional convention, available here.

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