Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog

The D’Agostinos were embroiled in prolonged litigation with Lynch and his lawyers. After a summary judgment for more than $1.9 million in the D’Agostinos’s favor, they began supplemental proceedings to collect. More litigation ensued, including an appeal, concerning a contempt proceeding against Lynch.

After all of that was resolved, the D’Agostinos issued citations to Murphy and Bryan Cave, respectively a lawyer and a law firm who had represented Lynch. Their theory was that Lynch, to avoid paying the D’Agostinos, had given the lawyers money. Their motion to compel Murphy and Bryan Cave to turn over the money was denied on November 7, 2007.

Within 30 days, the D’Agostinos filed a “Motion to Amend Memorandum and Judgment.” That motion asked for a finding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (permitting an immediate interlocutory appeal). That motion was granted on December 12, 2007. And within 30 days, the D’Agostinos appealed the denial of the original turnover motion.

Murphy and Bryan Cave moved to dismiss the appeal. They argued that the November 7 order was final in “a section 2-1402 proceeding [citation proceeding by a judgment creditor] and that, therefore, under Rule 304(b)(4), it was immediately appealable without a special finding [under Rule 304(a)]” Because the appeal was filed more than 30 days after the November 7 order, the lawyers argued, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the case.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed. “Here, the order in question foreclosed the D’Agostinos from collecting the funds in question from Murphy and Bryan Cave. Therefore, it was final and immediately appealable under Rule 304(b)(4). Because the D’Agostinos failed to file a notice of appeal from the November 7, 2007 order within 30 days, this court is without jurisdiction to review the order.”

The D’Agostinos argued that their motion to amend was a proper attack on the judgment, and thus extended the time to file their appeal. But the appellate court disagreed.

In order for a postjudgment motion to have the effect of tolling the time in which to appeal the judgment, that motion must be “directed against the judgment.” … A motion is said to be directed against the judgment when it attacks the judgment in one of the statutorily authorized ways, which include by requesting rehearing, retrial, modification, or vacation of the judgment … The party may also request “other relief” so long as that motion requests a change in the reasons underlying the judgment along the lines of the enumerated forms of relief … Here, the D’Agostino’s “Motion to Amend Memorandum Decision and Judgment” does not attack the judgment or its underlying rationale but, rather, accepts it and requests a Rule 304(a) finding. However, a Rule 304(a) finding was not necessary because of Rule 304(b)(4). … Therefore, it did not have the effect of tolling the time in which to appeal.

Read the whole case, D’Agostino v. Lymch, No. 1-08-0140 (5/7/08), by clicking here.

IRMO Schweiger continues the disagreement in the Second District Illinois Appellate Court over the appealability of a postdissolution judgment in a divorce matter when a contempt proceeding still is pending.

Eugene and Jean Marie were divorced in 1990. The dissolution order required Eugene to split the proceeds with Jean Marie of the sale of real property. Eugene sold the property in 2005, but he did not share the profit. So Jean Marie filed an action for indirect civil contempt. The trial court ordered Eugene to pay $76,903 to Marie. When Eugene didn’t pay, Jean Marie filed another contempt petition. Eugene then appealed the judgment, but Jean Marie’s second contempt petition still was pending.

Eugene appealed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) (contempt orders are immediately appealable if they impose a monetary or other penalty). But the appellate court stated that Rule 304(b)(5) did not apply. “Initially, this appeal cannot be one under Rule 304(b)(5) . That rule explicitly states that it applies to an order that imposes a penalty for contempt. The trial court plainly did not impose any penalty here. Yes, it entered a judgment against Eugene, but that judgment was merely the amount it calculated that Eugene owed under the dissolution judgment … To calculate and order payment of what is already due cannot reasonably be understood as a punishment. Thus, the order that Eugene pay $76,903 did not impose a penalty and so was not appealable under Rule 304(b)(5).”

Eugene also argued that the judgment was appealable as a final judgment under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301. The appellate court also rejected that position. “An order is not final where jurisdiction is retained for matters of substantial controversy … Here, the September 22, 2006, order did not finally resolve the litigation between the parties on the issue of whether Eugene had wilfully and contumaciously refused to comply with the trial court's orders to pay Jean 50% of the proceeds from the sale of the property. Although the trial court entered a $76,903 money judgment, it expressly retained jurisdiction over and continued the proceedings on Jean's second contempt petition. Thus, at the time Eugene filed his notice of appeal, this second contempt petition remained pending and had not been resolved. The pendency of this second contempt petition rendered the September 22, 2006, order nonfinal and rendered the notice of appeal from that order premature.”

This case brought out the disagreement in the Illinois Second District about the appealability of a post dissolution judgment while a contempt petition still is pending. Justice Grometer’s concurring opinion defended IRMO Gutman, 376 Ill. App. 3d 758 (2007), which ruled that a pending contempt petition in a postdissolution matter did not rob the judgment of finality, and thus appealability. Less than two months later, in IRMO Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1042 (2007), another panel of the Second District overruled Gutman.

The concurring opinion is good reading, and also discusses the value of stare decisis. Justice Grometer clearly believes IRMO Gutman is correctly decided, and IRMO Knoerr is wrong. But in the end, Justice Grometer deferred to IRMO Knoerr.

So, what to do now? I can dissent here from the majority's reliance on Knoerr, and I can bide my time until I am on a panel with at least one justice who will join me in overruling it. Of course, it would be only a matter of time until that new case was overruled, and then the overruling case was overruled, and so on in perpetuity. Meanwhile, the public would simply throw up its hands, marveling at this court's stubborn refusal to perform its core function, to clearly communicate reliable principles of law.

This is too high a price for my adherence to Gutman. I will do what Knoerr should have done, and I will defer to this court's most recent statement of the law. Thus, in this case, I join the majority in following Knoerr, and, in the interest of our constituents, I would urge my colleagues to do the same.

The Illinois Supreme Court has agreed to review IRMO Gutman, so maybe we’ll get a final word on this soon. You can get the whole case, IRMO Schweiger, No. 2-06-1005 (1/23/08), by clicking here. See my previous reporting on Knoerr and Gutman by clicking here and here.

Lee Isringhausen, an Illinois resident, contracted with APM Custom Homes, a Florida corporation, to build a home in Marco Island, Florida. Lee died before the house was built. APM returned most of the $100,000 deposit to Lee’s estate, but kept $42,500 of it as a construction-management fee.

Susan Isringhausen, executor of Lee’s estate, sued APM for the $42,500, in an Illinois court. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over APM. Susan appealed, but the Fourth District Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of her case.

The trial court ruled that it did not have “general jurisdiction” over APM because APM did not have continuous and systematic business contacts in Illinois. Susan argued that the trial court had “specific jurisdiction” over APM − i.e. the case arose “from ‘the making or performance’ of a contract that is ‘substantially connected’ to Illinois.”

Even though the trial court did not consider “specific jurisdiction,” the appellate court stated it could review the question. “[W]e must make our determination of jurisdiction based on a de novo review of the documents on record … Therefore, any apparent failure on the part of the trial court to consider the question of specific jurisdiction in its written memorandum of opinion does not mandate a reversal. Rather, we must take it upon ourselves to examine the question of specific jurisdiction.”

The appellate court sided with APM and ruled that the trial court did not have jurisdiction. Get the whole case, Estate of Isringhausen v. Prime Contractors and Associates, No. 4-07-0345 (1/29/08), by clicking here.

Here’s another reason to read and re-read the rules. This one involved pro se appellants who tried to appeal a summary judgment entered against them on their counterclaim against a bank. They filed their Notice of Appeal in the appellate court, not in the trial court as is required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303. Nor did Rule 365 save the appeal. So the appeal was dismissed.

The Second District Illinois Appellate Court explained:

As pertinent here, Rule 365 states, "If a case is appealed to either the Supreme Court or the Appellate Court, or the wrong district of the Appellate Court, which should have been appealed to a different court, the case shall be transferred to the proper court." … That language simply has nothing to do with this case. Had defendants timely filed their notice of appeal in the trial court but wrongly stated that they were seeking review in the supreme court or in a district of the appellate court other than this one, then Rule 365 would have required the transfer of the case to this court. However, defendants did not appeal to the wrong court. They appealed to the proper court but did not file the notice of appeal in the trial court on time. Rule 365 did not excuse defendants from their obligation under Rule 303(a)(1) to file a timely notice of appeal in the trial court.

The whole case, First Bank v. Phillips, No. 2-07-0130 (2/8/08), is available by clicking here.

Victoria McGill hired Friedman & Solmor to represent her in her auto accident case. The law firm represented Victoria on a contingent fee arrangement until about one month before trial was scheduled. The firm withdrew as a result of a dispute with Victoria over whether to accept a settlement offer.

Victoria got new counsel, who went to trial and got a verdict in excess of $180,000. Friedman & Solmar notified Victoria about a lien it had earlier served. Victoria in turn petitioned to adjudicate the lien. Her petition was denied, and F&S was granted a $20,500 quantum meruit judgment. Victoria appealed that judgment.

Victoria’s Notice of Appeal stated she was appealing from the judgment granting fees; it did not identify the order stating F&S had good cause to withdraw. Nonetheless, Victoria asserted that F&S did not have good cause to withdraw. F&S argued that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the question of good cause because the order was not listed in Victoria’s notice of appeal.

The First District Illinois Court of Appeals sided with Victoria on this question. The court recognized the general rule that it “acquires no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts of judgments not specified or inferred from the notice of appeal.” But in this case, “the good-cause finding was clearly a step in the procedural progression leading to the granting of the fee petition. Indeed, the good-cause finding was a necessary prerequisite to awarding F & S fees and costs in quantum meruit. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of plaintiff's argument.”

F&S lost that battle, but won the war. The judgment for fees was affirmed. Read the whole case, McGill v. Garza, No. 1-06-3027 (12/13/07), by clicking here.

LeRoy Voga sued his son, Lyle, to collect on a defaulted promissory note. After LeRoy got a judgment, Lyle’s former wife, Teresa, , intervened to quiet title to real property she had been awarded in her divorce proceeding with Lyle, seeking to prevent LeRoy from levyng on the property.

Teresa was granted summary judgment. Soon after, LeRoy died. Before a special representative for the estate was named, LeRoy’s attorney moved to vacate the summary judgment. After a special representative was appointed, the trial court denied the motion to vacate.

The special representative, Larry, appealed the summary judgment. Teresa moved to dismiss the appeal. She asserted that the motion to vacate the summary judgment was a nullity and therefore did not toll the time to file the Notice of Appeal. Without the tolling period, Teresa argued, the Notice of Appeal was late and did not confer appellate jurisdiction.

Teresa’s nullity argument was based on the fact that the motion to vacate was made before a special representative was appointed. With no representative, Teresa concluded, there was no plaintiff, so the motion to vacate was made without authority.

The Illinois Second District Appellate Court rejected Teresa’s position. The court ruled that the period after LeRoy’s death and before Larry’s appointment — a time the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case — could not be counted toward the time to appeal. Larry had been appointed special representative on January 9, 2007, and he participated in the hearing on the motion to vacate the next day. “Thus, by any reasonable calculation, on January 10, 2007 there was a timely oral postjudgment motion before the trial court. The court denied the motion, and Larry appealed within 30 days of the denial. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Larry’s appeal.”

Get the whole case, Voga v. Voga, No. 2-07-0176 (12/4/07), by clicking here.

I mentioned IRMO Gutman in my January 3, 2008 entry regarding IRMO Knoerr. In IRMO Knoerr, the Second District Illinois Appellate Court overruled IRMO Gutman, which was only two months old at the time. On January 30, 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court announced it will review IRMO Gutman.

In IRMO Gutman, the Second District ruled that a pending civil contempt petition was a “separate claim” from the underlying divorce lawsuit. As a result, the divorce matters could be appealed while the contempt proceeding was pending without benefit of a Rule 304(a) order (trial court may allow appeal of final order of fewer than all claims). In IRMO Knoerr, another panel of the Second District ruled just the opposite and overruled IRMO Gutman.

Here’s to hoping the Illinois Supreme Court will settle the matter. I’ll keep you informed.

Glen Dresher’s son, 35 years old, was developmentally disabled and autistic. In 2001, Dresher was convicted of attempted murder when he struck his wife with his car several times. In 2006, Roseanne Dresher moved to have Glen removed as guardian of their son’s estate. That pro se motion was denied, but the court sua sponte temporarily removed Glen as guardian.

Glen appealed on the basis that the Probate Act did not give the court authority to order a temporary removal. The son’s Guardian Ad Litem moved to dismiss the appeal. The GAL argued that the order that temporarily removed guardianship rights was not a final order, and therefore Glen could not invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed that it did not have jurisdiction. “… [T]he orders Glen appeals from were not final orders. The first October 16, 2006, order explicitly stated that, upon the court's own motion, Glen was ‘temporarily removed’ from his guardianship position. The second order similarly stated that the authority of Glen as co-guardian was suspended pending a hearing on the citation. Thus, there is no question that the trial court's orders did not 'finally determine, fix and dispose of the parties' rights'”

Glen also tried to invoke jurisdiction through Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304, which permits appeal of an otherwise nonfinal order when the trial court rules there is "no just cause or reason to delay enforcement or appeal."

In this case, the trial court did make a Rule 304 finding. But the appellate court rejected the trial court’s finding, stating, “… [T]he addition of that language did not alter the fact that the court's orders were not final as to any claim or party and were, thus, not subject to Rule 304(a). Such a finding by a trial court is not effective to transform a disposition that is not final in its own right into a final judgment.”

Glen was hardly a sympathetic appellant, but what if was right about the trial court not having authority to temporarily remove guardianship rights? This appellate opinion in effect says the trial court’s action cannot be contested on appeal.

Read the whole opinion, In re Guardianship of J.D., No. 1-06-3069 (9/28/07), by clicking here.

In an insurance coverage dispute, Illinois Farmers moved to dismiss Secura Insurance’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Farmers argued that Secura’s Notice of Appeal, mailed to the court the 30th day after the judgment, was deficient because the certificate of service did not state the time of mailing, a requirement of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3). Farmers argued that Secura’s failure to strictly comply with the Supreme Court’s rules doomed the Notice of Filing, thus depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction.

The Second District Illinois Appellate Court rejected Farmers’ position and ruled that jurisdiction was proper. The court ruled that the failure to state the time of service was a very slight defect that did not interfere with or preclude review. Adding “the fact that Farmers does not allege prejudice, we conclude that the defect here amounts to harmless error.”

Get the whole case, Secura Ins. Co. v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., No. 2-06-0614 (11/7/07), by clicking here.

Almon Heastie was intoxicated, and in need of medical attention. Paramedics brought him to a hospital emergency room. Because he was yelling and abusive, Almon was placed on a cart and in restraints. For lack of space at the hospital, Almon was wheeled into the cast room, where he was left alone.

A fire broke out in the cast room, and Almon suffered severe injuries. He sued the hospital, one of the security guards, and a number of emergency room staffers. A jury returned a verdict for defendants, so Almon appealed. The appellate court (1) ruled that it was proper to preclude Almon’s evidence that the hospital deviated from a standard of care by not searching him for contraband; but (2) reversed and remanded for a new trial, ruling that the trial court improperly dismissed Almon’s res ipsa loquitor cause of action. Defendants then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which agreed that plaintiff should have been allowed to put on a res ipsa case.

Almon also raised an argument in the Supreme Court. He disputed the appellate court’s ruling that affirmed preclusion of the standard of care evidence. However, Almon did not file a petition for leave to appeal that part of the appellate court’s ruling.

No matter. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Almon’s appeal still was proper. “Although plaintiff did not file a separate petition for leave to appeal, none was required. Plaintiff is entitled to raise the additional issue under [Illinois Supreme Court] Rule 318(a), which provides that in all appeals ‘any appellee, respondent, or coparty may seek and obtain any relief warranted by the record on appeal without having filed a separate petition for leave to appeal or notice of cross-appeal or separate appeal.’ … This court has invoked Rule 318(a) in finding that allowance of one party's petition for leave to appeal brings before this court the other party's requests for cross-relief.”

Be careful here: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 318 applies only to appeals from the appellate court to the Supreme Court. It does not apply to appeals from the circuit court to the court of appeals.

The whole opinion, Heastie v. Roberts, No. 102428 (11/1/07), is available by clicking here.

The Appellate Law and Practice Blog reports on Malloy v. WM Specialty Mortgage, No. 07-1026, a First Circuit opinion that the blog calls “the height of appellate nerdery.” The court ruled that a premature notice of appeal became effective, and bestowed appellate jurisdiction, after the district court denied a motion to vacate what sounds like a conditional dismissal order.

This appeal arises from Nancy Knoerr’s post-dissolution petitions to increase child support and to force her ex-husband, David, to contribute to college expenses of one of their children. David moved for reconsideration after Nancy got a favorable result on her petitions. Nancy then petitioned for a rule to show cause, claiming that David refused to comply with the orders increasing child support and David’s contribution to the college expenses.

The trial court denied David’s motion to reconsider, and continued Nancy’s petition for a rule to show cause. The trial court did not issue Rule 304(a) language (allowing an interlocutory appeal). David appealed the ruling on Nancy’s petitions while the rule to show cause still was pending.

This is another case in which the Second District Illinois Appellate Court assessed its jurisdiction without benefit of a motion contesting jurisdiction. The appellate court dismissed the appeal because the still-pending rule to show cause rendered the action non-final.

The appellate court overruled another Second District opinion, Marriage of Gutman, 376 Ill. App. 3d 378, No. 2-06-0213 (2007). Gutman, which was decided on October 16, 2007, ruled exactly opposite of Knoerr. (“… [T]he Gutman court held that civil contempt petitions initiate separate proceedings and not ‘claims’ within the action, thereby excepting them from Rule 304(a). However, we believe that Gutman’s conclusion, that pending or denied civil contempt petitions are not subject to Rule 304(a), is based on a flawed analysis, and we overrule it.”

The panels were different in the two cases. Gutman was written by Justice Grometer, Callum and Gilleran Johnson concurring. Knoerr was written by Justice Bowman, McLaren and Zenoff concurring. It’s interesting to see the court overrule an opinion that was just two months old and written by a different panel.

The whole opinion, IRMO Knoerr, No. 2-06-1060 (12/21/07), is available by clicking here.

Malcom Rush was incarcerated in Waupun Correctional Institution in Wisconsin. He appealed after the federal district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. But Rush’s Notice of Appeal did not get filed within the 30-day deadline.

The issue was whether Rush complied with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c), the prisoner mailbox rule. That rule states that the date of filing is the date the prisoner places the mail in the prison mail system. The rule also requires an affidavit by the prisoner that the mail was timely placed in the system and that postage was prepaid.

Rush signed an affidavit that said he placed the document in the mail system timely and that the prison had committed to paying for the postage. But the court ruled that the latter point was not true. Because Rule 4 requires the postage to be paid, the court concluded that Rush’s Notice of Appeal was not timely, thus depriving the court of appellate jurisdiction. “Postage was not prepaid at the time of deposit because Rush did not secure his right to an exemption for a loan from the warden. Therefore the statement in his declaration that Waupun had ‘precommitted’ to paying for the postage as of June 9, 2006, is not true, and does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 4(c)(1).”

Read the whole opinion, Ingram v. Jones, Nos. 06-2766, 06-2879 (12/7/07), by clicking here. (Unameded September 07 opinion.)

Resurgent Financial took an assignment of credit card receivables from MBNA. Joan Kelly’s account was included among those assigned to Resurgent, or so Resurgent claimed. Kelly said she didn’t owe anything, and refused to pay Resurgent, so Resurgent sued her.

Kelly served requests for admission on Resurgent, which Resurgent did not answer. After the requests were deemed admitted, Kelly moved for summary judgment. That motion was denied. Resurgent then moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. That motion was granted. Kelly in turn moved for attorney fees under the Illinois Credit Card Liability Act. The fee motion was denied.

Kelly appealed the denial of her motions for summary judgment and for attorney fees. The Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed Kelly’s appeal, stating that neither order was final and appealable.

The appellate court acknowledged that an order allowing a voluntary dismissal is a final order. But that does not make all previous interlocutory orders appealable. “It is true that an appeal from a final judgment draws into issue all previous interlocutory orders that produced the final judgment … But such orders must constitute procedural steps in the progression leading to the entry of the final judgment … The denial of summary judgment is not a procedural step to an order of voluntary dismissal … Thus, the denial here was neither a final judgment nor a procedural step to a final judgment, and it is not appealable.”

Nor was the order denying Kelly’s attorney fee request final. The court stated: “The trial court did not finally determine that Kelly was not entitled to fees. Instead, it ruled that, because there had been no final determination of the merits of the complaint, Kelly's motion was premature … In effect, having dismissed Resurgence's complaint without prejudice, the court denied Kelly's motion for fees without prejudice. Thus, that order also is not appealable.”

You can get the whole opinion, Resurgence Financial v. Kelly, No. 2-06-1120 (9/20/07), by clicking here.

Janet Chochorowski rented a power tiller from a Home Depot in Missouri. She claimed she did not want to purchase a damage waiver, but that she was charged for it anyway. She turned her grievance into a class action lawsuit in Illinois.

Janet’s breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims were dismissed. That left her with a single claim under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. Home Depot moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens. The trial court denied the motion, but on a permissive interlocutory appeal, the appellate court reversed. Chochorowski asked for and was granted a rehearing.

On rehearing, the appellate court considered whether it had jurisdiction to review Home Depot’s forum non conveniens motion made pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(4) (allowing a permissive appeal “from the denial of a motion for transfer of venue to a court within another county in the state.") The Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that Home Depot sought to have the case re-filed in Missouri, not transferred to another Illinois county. Thus, the court ruled that it did not have “authority to grant leave to appeal from the nonfinal order disposing of that issue.” That part of Home Depot’s appeal was dismissed.

Read the whole case, Chochorowski v. Home Depot U.S.A., No. 5-06-0308 (9/21/07), by clicking here.