Illinois Supreme Court Rules

October 23, 2009

Reconsideration Motion Untimely So Illinois Supreme Court Dismisses Appeal

The Illinois Supreme Court recently reversed the appellate court and dismissed Jennifer Keener’s appeal. Jennifer sued the City of Herrin on behalf of Chelsea Keener’s estate. Chelsea had been taken into custody by Herrin police for unlawful consumption of alcohol. After the police let Chelsea leave, she was struck by an automobile and killed.

Herrin asked for, and received, a dismissal of Jennifer’s amended complaint. But the court clerk did not mail a copy of the dismissal order to Jennifer’s lawyer. Apparently unaware of the dismissal, seven months later, Jennifer’s lawyer filed a response to Herrin’s motion to dismiss.

Four months after that, the case was heard on Herrin’s request for a status conference. At the status conference, the trial court stated its intention to reconsider the dismissal “upon written motion to be submitted” by Jennifer. The trial court ultimately denied Jennifer’s motion to reconsider.

October 8, 2009

End-Of-Paragraph Fact Cites Comply With Illinois Supreme Court Rules

by Steven R. Merican

Charles Gaston sued the City of Danville, Illinois for the wrongful death of his son. Charles appealed after the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the city.

The record citations in the fact section of the city’s appellate brief were placed at the end of each paragraph, rather than after each sentence. Charles asked the appellate court to strike the facts in the city’s brief and the arguments that relied on those facts. He argued that the city’s method of record citation violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6), which requires an accurate and fully cited fact section.

The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court denied Charles’s request and allowed the city’s brief to stand. The court explained:

September 27, 2009

Premature Notice Of Appeal Deprives Court Of Jurisdiction To Review Conditional Release Of Sexually Violent Person

by Steven R. Merican

Benjamin Hernandez, adjudicated to be a sexually violent person under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, was placed on conditional release. The State appealed, but filed its notice of appeal before the trial court approved the conditional release plan. Nor did the State file a new notice of appeal after the conditional release plan was approved.

The Second District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed the appeal because the State’s only notice of appeal was premature. When the trial court entered the order that placed Hernandez on conditional release, it also continued the case “for the presentation of a release plan.” The order for conditional release was not final and appealable, the court ruled, because:

[It] necessitated and contemplated further action by the court to determine the conditions of release. The [trial] court expressly retained jurisdiction over the proceedings for approval of the conditional release plan, as required by statute … We determine that the reservation of jurisdiction for the purpose of entering a conditional release plan shows that not all of the issues in dispute were fully addressed and settled by the July 3 [conditional release] order. Thus, the July 3 order was not final.

September 7, 2009

Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Not A Final Order; Appealable By Petition, Not Notice Of Appeal

by Steven R. Merican

Dennis and Kimberly Quaids’ newborn twins were hospitalized at Cedars-Sanai Hospital in Los Angeles, California for a staph infection. The babies were given Heparin instead of Hep-Lock, as was prescribed by the physician. The Quaids settled a claim against the hospital before a lawsuit was filed. They sued Baxter Healthcare Corporation, the manufacturer of both medications. The Quaids’ chief claim was that the labeling for both medications was too much alike for hospital personnel to distinguish between them.

The Quaids, residents of California, filed the lawsuit in Cook County, Illinois. Baxter asked the Cook County trial court to dismiss the case on the basis of forum non conveniens − i.e., that California was a more convenient location for this case.

The Cook County trial court agreed that California was the more convenient forum and dismissed the Illinois case. The Quaids filed a petition for leave to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2), which specifically permits a party to do so. But Baxter argued that the trial court’s dismissal was a final order. Thus, the only way the Quaids could have invoked appellate jurisdiction was to have filed a notice of appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301. [An appeal is initiated by filing a notice of appeal.]

August 16, 2009

Pending Motion To Disqualify Attorney Deprives Appellate Court Of Jurisdiction To Consider Custody Order

by Steven R. Merican

Neringa Valkiunas and Jeffrey Olsen were in a protracted custody battle. Neringa first appealed from a custody modification order that made Jeffrey residential custodian. That first appeal was dismissed by the Second District Illinois Appellate Court because, when the appeal was filed, two civil contempt petitions were pending in the trial court. The pending contempt petitions rendered the notice of appeal premature.

Before the dismissal of the appeal, Jeffrey filed a motion in the trial court to disqualify Neringa’s lawyer. After the trial court ruled on the contempt petitions, Neringa moved for rehearing of the dismissal in the appellate court. The request for a rehearing was granted. But unknown to the appellate court at that time, the motion to disqualify still was pending in the trial court.

So the question was: Did Neringa’s notice of appeal give the appellate court jurisdiction, or did the pending motion to disqualify Neringa’s lawyer deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction?

August 4, 2009

Order On Partial Fee Petition Not Appealable. Merits Panel Dismissal Trumps Motion Panel.

by Steven R. Merican

Michael Gagliardo died in a racing-car accident. Paulette (sister) and Margaret (wife) administered Michael’s estate. They hired Quinlan & Carroll to investigate whether the estate could sue for wrongful death. Paulette later hired Duane Morris, another law firm, to open an estate in court. Duane Morris was on the job only for a few months, after which Paulette hired Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw.

Paulette asked the trial court to determine how much attorney fees were owed to which law firms. Quinlan, an “interested party” to the estate proceeding, asked for a substitution of judge to determine its right to fees. Quinlan’s request was granted.

Duane Morris filed its fee petition covering the entire time it represented the estate. Mayer Brown filed its fee petition for a part of the time it represented the estate. The trial court granted some of the law firms’ claims for fees.

July 18, 2009

Illinois Supreme Court Refuses To Consider Forfeiture Argument Because Appellate Court Briefs Not In The Record

by Steven R. Merican

Michael Ready was killed at a work site when a wooden truss that was being rigged for scaffolding fell eight floors and struck him. Michael’s widow, Terry, as administrator of Michael’s estate, sued the contractor, BMW Constructors, and United/Goedecke Services, the scaffolding subcontractor. After BMW and United filed third-party complaints for contribution against Michael’s employer, Midwest Generation, Terry also sued Midwest.

Terry settled with BMW and United for more than $1.1 million. She went to trial against United. After subtracting offsets for Michael’s comparative negligence and the settlement, Terry was awarded $8.137 million.

An appellate court affirmed the judgment and ruled that United forfeited the right to challenge the amount of the award. United forfeited the issue, the appellate court stated, because the company mentioned it only in a “concluding remarks” section of its brief. Violating Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), United “failed to set forth in its brief ‘specific reasons or argument as to why the damage award was excessive or unreasonable’ and failed to ‘specifically argue that the damage award was improper.’”

June 21, 2009

Public Defender Cannot Appeal Partial Dismissal But Wins Certified Interlocutory Appeal

by Steven R. Merican

Edwin Burnette, the Public Defender of Cook County, sued Todd Stroger, President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners. Burnette was angry because Stroger selected personnel in the Public Defender’s Office to be laid off and imposed unpaid furlough days on other employees in the office. Burnette claimed he was not consulted in the process.

Relying on the Illinois Public Defender Act [actually Sections 3-4000 through 3-4011 of the Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/3-4008.1 – 4011], Burnette’s lawsuit contested Stroger’s authority to take those actions. Stroger in turn asked the trial court to dismiss the case. He argued he acted within his authority and Burnette did not have standing to sue. Stroger’s request was granted and denied in part.

Burnette did two things: (1) He sought to amend his complaint to work around the aspects the trial court dismissed; (2) He asked for an interlocutory appeal. [Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) allows interlocutory appeals when “the trial court … finds that the order involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation … The Appellate Court may thereupon in its discretion allow an appeal from the order.”]

May 2, 2009

Appeal Of Post-Judgment Motion Not Saved By Rule 303

by Steven R. Merican

Bridgette Glickman, owner of a condominium unit, fell on ice in a stairway at the condo building. She sustained multiple fractures to her ankle. Among others, she sued the condominium association for negligent maintenance of the stairway.

The trial court dismissed Glickman’s complaint against the association because the accident happened before the association elected its first board of managers. The case proceeded against the other defendants − the developer and the designer of the building. Glickman appealed the dismissal of the association within the mandated 30-day deadline. About four months later, she asked the trial court for permission to file an amended complaint against the association.

The trial court denied Glickman’s request to amend, so she made the denial part of her appeal. The First District Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the ruling that Glickman’s request came too late for the trial court to decide. The filing of Glickman’s notice of appeal did not relieve the trial court of jurisdiction. But her failure to file the request to amend within 30 days did. Here’s what the appellate court stated:

April 16, 2009

No Appellate Standing For Knox County Employees Being Investigated; Appellate Court Lacks Supervisory Authority To Order A Special Prosecutor On Remand

by Steven R. Merican

This lawsuit grows from a political fight in Knox County, Illinois. After he took office as Knox County State’s Attorney, John Pepmeyer began an investigation into “improprieties” by current and former county employees of the county state’s attorney’s and sheriff’s offices. Two Assistant State’s Attorneys, Dean Stone and Michael Kraycinovich, were targets of Pepmeyer’s investigation. Stone and Kraycinovich in turn started their own investigation of Pepmeyer concerning allegations that he was guilty of sexual harassment.

Stone and Kraycinovich asked the trial court for appointment of a special counsel for their investigation into Pepmeyer. Pepmeyer asked the court for a special prosecutor for his investigation into Stone and Kraycinovich. The trial court appointed the Illinois Attorney General as special prosecutor of both investigations.

The trial court later modified the appointments. The Attorney General was left to investigate Pepmeyer. A former State’s Attorney for another county, William Poncin, was named special prosecutor to investigate “other Knox County public officials,” including Stone and Kraycinovich.