Articles Posted in Standard of Review

We pick up today with the second part of the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections. (The entry directly below explains the important facts and the court’s ruling that it has power to review tie votes rendered by the Board.)

The supreme court also ruled on the correct standard of review of the Board’s decision: “clearly erroneious.”

Arguments over the standard of review ran to both ends of scale − the Republicans arguing the Board should get no discretion, the Board arguing that its decision should be reviewed for “abuse of discretion.” Here is how the court described the parties’ positions: “The Party argues that the dismissals should be reviewed de novo because the Board did not make a decision that may be granted deference. Conversely, the Board argues that the dismissals should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. According to the Board, the “justifiable grounds” standard grants it discretion to dismiss complaints after preliminary investigations.”

Molly, a dachshund, was mauled by Cosmo, a Siberian Huskie. Mark and Mindy Leith, Molly’s owners, sued Andrew Frost, Cosmo’s owner, for tortious damage to property. After a bench trial, a judge awarded nominal damages to Mark and Mindy. They thought they should have been awarded the several thousand dollars they paid a veterinarian who treated Molly. So Mark and Mindy appealed.

The case is important for appellate practitioners because it points out a common mistake in stating the correct standard of review. Andrew argued that “the manifest weight of the evidence did not show that Cosmo was the dog that attacked Molly.” But Andrew’s statement of the standard of review was exactly the opposite of correct one. The party appealing has to show that the court’s conclusion was against the manifest weight of the evidence, not that the winner in the trial court failed to prove his case by the manifest weight. The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court explained:

This argument [Andrew’s] misstates the standard of review. If we asked whether the manifest weight of the evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings, our standard of review would be de novo. Instead, we are to ask a deferential question: whether the court’s factual findings or conclusions are against the manifest weight of the evidence … A conclusion is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is apparent from the record … A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence … The court concluded that plaintiffs had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cosmo attacked Molly. The opposite conclusion–that plaintiff failed to so prove–is not apparent from the record. The court found that Cosmo attacked Molly. That finding is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or lacking in any evidentiary basis. Plaintiffs and defendant had been next-door neighbors for three weeks. Mindy Leith testified she had looked over the fence and had seen Cosmo. She testified she stood over Cosmo as Cosmo mauled Molly.

Two children died after they were trapped by a “quick” condition at an excavation pit. They became stuck in sand and clay at the pit, and died of hypothermia or drowning. The children’s estates sued the owner of the excavation pit, who tendered the claims to his insurer. The insurer offered the estates a policy limit settlement, but calculated the policy limit on the basis that there had been only one policy “occurrence.” The estates argued there were two separate “occurrences.” The insurer sued the estates, and asked for a declaration that there had been only one “occurrence.”

The trial court agreed with the estates, and on summary judgment ruled in their favor. The insurance company appealed, and a sympathetic appellate court reversed and ruled in favor of the insurer. The estates then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The first issue for the Illinois Supreme Court was the proper standard of review in the appellate court. The parties agreed that the construction of “occurrence” was a contract question that was subject to de novo (no deference to the trial court) review.

Sandra Downey sued her doctor, Gary Dunnington, for medical malpractice when a mastectomy and reconstruction he performed resulted in permanent disfigurement. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for Dunnington.

On appeal, Sandra argued that it was reversible error to admit evidence that Dunnington’s father was a minister and his mother was a stay-at-home-mom. The Fourth District Illinois Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was “wholly irrelevant to the issues in this trial, and the use of such evidence constitutes an aberrant practice that should not be tolerated.”

Despite the trial court’s abuse of discretion in allowing the evidence, the appellate court ruled it was not bad enough to reverse the defense judgment.

Edmond Jones sued Nissan because, he claimed, the car he bought was a lemon. The purchase agreement required Jones to submit his claim to an automotive complaint resolution program before he was allowed to sue in court. He did that twice, and twice his claim was dismissed. It was dismissed the first time because he missed the scheduled vehicle inspection time. It was dismissed the second time because, it having been repossessed, he no longer owned the car.

Jones then filed a lawsuit against Nissan. Nissan asked the court to dismiss the case because Jones did not comply with Nissan’s the informal dispute settlement procedure. The trial court agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. Jones then appealed.

Jones and Nissan first argued about the proper standard of review in the appellate court. Jones argued for a de novo standard of review, which is typical when an appellate court considers whether a motion to dismiss a complaint was properly granted. Nissan stated that the trial court’s dismissal should get more deference, and argued for an abuse of discretion standard.

Judy Anderson died while in care of Rush-Copley Medical Center. Her estate sued Rush for medical malpractice. In discovery, Rush refused to turn over two categories of documents: medical journal articles and an Action Plan. Rush claimed the documents were used in connection with a peer review and therefore were privileged under the Illinois Medical Studies Act.

The Second District Illinois Appellate Court identified the proper standard of review. The court distinguished this case from a typical question of whether a legal privilege applied, and decided that the trial court deserved more deference. “Whether a discovery privilege applies is a matter of law, subject to de novo review … However, whether specific materials are part of an internal quality control or a medical study is a factual determination, which will not be reversed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

In the end, the appellate court ruled that the articles and the plan were privileged and did not have to be disclosed. Read the whole case, Anderson v. Rush-Copley Medical Center, Nos. 2097-0717, 2-07-1272 (8/14/08), by clicking here.

The Illinois Environmental Agency awarded a pollution discharge license to U.S. Steel Corporation. American Bottom Conservancy filed an objection to the award to the Illinois Pollution Control Board. American Bottom objected because the Agency did not hold a public hearing concerning the issuance of the license.

The Illinois Pollution Control Board agreed with American Bottom, and invalidated the license. U.S. Steel appealed the Board’s decision. The parties argued about the proper standard of review by the appellate court and by the Pollution Control Board. Here’s how the Fifth District Illinois Appellate Court framed the issue: “The issue presented to us for our review is whether the Board applied the correct standard of review in reviewing the Agency’s decision not to hold a public hearing on the proposed permit.”

U.S. Steel argued for de novo review, stating that only a question of law was before the court. But the Pollution Board argued for a more deferential manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review. The appellate court agreed with U.S. Steel. “The only issue before us on appeal is whether the Board erred as a matter of law in applying the incorrect standard of review in deciding that the Agency erred in failing to hold a public hearing. This presents a question of law, which we review de novo.”

Priscilla Rosolowski was the named plaintiff in a class-action lawsuit against Clark Refining and Marketing. The class consisted of residents who lived near Clark’s oil refinery. They claimed the refinery was a nuisance.

A first trial judge certified the class. A second trial judge denied Clark’s motion to decertify the class. Clark tried again for decertification, but a third judge, the one who tried the case, denied Clark’s motion.

A trial resulted in a $120 million verdict against Clark, $40 million of it for punitive damages. Clark then filed motions to vacate the judgment, for a new trial, and for decertification of the class. One year later, the trial court granted Clark’s motions.