William Huber filed a lawsuit to dissolve the American Accounting Association. The Association asked the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit, which it did.

Huber appealed. He mailed his Notice of Appeal to the court, but it arrived two days after the 30-day deadline.

That would have been okay had Huber included an affidavit (required of a non-lawyer) or certificate (required of a lawyer) of mailing with the Notice of Appeal. But Huber did not. He argued that a postmark on the envelope, dated two days before the 30-day deadline expired, was sufficient proof of mailing within the time required.

Chester Bross Construction Company was the low bidder on a number of Illinois Department of Transportation projects. But instead of awarding Bross the work, the Department suspended Bross from competing for any Department contracts for two years. The suspension was based on a dispute over whether Bross complied with a required internship program.

Bross asked the trial court to review the Department’s two-year suspension order. Bross appealed after the trial court sustained the suspension.

The two-year suspension expired while the case still was pending in the appellate court. So the first question the Fourth District Illinois Court of Appeals had to answer was whether Bross’s appeal was moot. [ “An issue is moot if no actual controversy exists or where events occur which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief.”]

Anita and Sushil Sheth got divorced. Sushil was custodian on several of the couple’s two children’s financial accounts. Anita asked the trial court to remove Sushil as custodian. The trial court did so, and also denied Sushil’s reconsideration request.

Sushil appealed. He apparently mailed the notice of appeal within the 30-day jurisdictional requirement. But his “Certificate of Service” was not notarized. The court received Sushil’s notice of appeal after the 30 days passed.

The First District Illinois Appellate Court dismissed Sushil’s appeal. The court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Sushil’s arguments because Sushil did not submit proper proof — that is, a notarized Proof of Service — that the notice of appeal had been mailed within the 30-day deadline  So even though Sushil’s proof of service included all of the required information, his appeal was dismissed for lack of a notary public’s stamp.

Lake Environmental was doing asbestos removal at Scott Air Force Base in southern Illinois. The State, claiming that Lake had violated regulations, persuaded the Department of Public Health to revoke Lake’s asbestos removal license. Lake asked the trial court to review the department’s decision. But while that review was still pending, the State filed another complaint in the Department that asked for penalties and an injunction.

The trial court reversed the Department’s decision to revoke the license. Lake then asked the court to sanction the State. The trial court denied the sanction request, but did not say why. So Lake appealed the denial of sanctions to the Illinois Fifth District Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ruled that it had no basis to affirm the denial of sanctions because the trial court’s terse denial did not meet the requirement that a court must provide a reasoned analysis for its sanctions ruling.

“Hey, c’mon Sr. illinoisappellatelawyerblog.com. Two months between postings? How do you expect to keep your readers? We’re writing briefs. We need all this stuff you write about. Nobody else does it, at least not like you. What’s your excuse now?”

“No excuses, none that are worth talking about anyway. Stick with me, my friend. I’ll do better.”

General contractor Kiferbaum Construction was sued by a subcontractor’s employee who was injured at the work site. Kiferbaum was represented by Jacobson & Riseborough. Kiferbaum got excess insurance from Evanston Insurance.

Kiferbaum’s insurers, including Evanston, settled with the employee. The insurers were left to fight about the amounts each would pay the employee. Jacobson & Riseborough committed Kiferbaum to participate in the settlement agreement, which required Kiferbaum to reimburse Evanston for $1 million the insurer put into the settlement pot. But Kiferbaum argued it did not give J&R authority to make the commitment. The trial court agreed and gave Kiferbaum summary judgment against Evanston’s claim for the money.

Unhappy about being saddled with the $1 million payment, Evanston sued J&R. Evanston’s first two complaints were dismissed {because they were premature; i.e., Evanston hadn’t been injured yet], but the trial court gave Evanston a chance to file another complaint that would meet legal standards. Evanston filed a second amended complaint, but the trial court, finding the complaint was filed too late under the statute of repose [six years from the offending act], dismisssed that one too. The trial court then denied Evanston’s request for reconsideration.

More than 58 percent of the voters in Country Club Hills, Illinois passed a referendum that reduced the number of city aldermen from 10 to five. About three weeks later, a group of unhappy aldermen sued the county clerk. They asked the trial court for a preliminary injunction to void the referendum because, they argued, the clerk exceeded her authority by not including certain language on the ballot.

Two weeks later, the trial court denied the injunction request because the discontented aldermen still had time to file as independent candidates for one of the five alderman positions.

Instead, the aldermen appealed. They asked the appellate court to void the referendum result and to place the question, with the disputed language, on the next ballot. That election, at which the voters elected five aldermen, was held about four months later, while the appeal was still pending.

After he was injured in an accident, Juan Zamora sued his employer, Newsboy Delivery Systems, and two individuals, Cherie and Richard Payne. Zamora claimed their negligence caused the accident.

The trial court dismissed Newsboy because Zamora’s claim against his employer was barred by the Illinois Worker’s Compensation Act. The dismissal order included a finding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) [no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order]. Zamora asked the court to reconsider the dismissal. That request for reconsideration extended the time he had to appeal [30 days from the ruling on the reconsideration request]. Zamora’s request for reconsideration was denied.

The Paynes filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Newsboy. About two years later that complaint was dismissed. Zamora got a second Rule 304(a) finding, and after the rest of the claims were dismissed, Zamora appealed the two year-old order that dismissed his claim against Newsboy.

Witte Brothers is an intersate trucking company. After an audit, under protest, Witte paid Illinois for “pass-through” miles [distance driven in Illinois without picking up or delivering goods].

Witte sued Illinois for reimbursement of the taxes. The trial court ruled that the Illinois Income Tax Act did not allow the State to tax truckers pass-through miles. So Illinois appealed.

Among other things, Witte argued in the appellate court that taxing pass-through miles violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But Witte did not raise this argument in the trial court, nor allege it as a separate count in its complaint. So the First District Illinois Appellate Court refused to consider the argument.

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