Bravo to Wayne Schiess for his candid and succinct seven suggestions for improving your writing. The title of the series, “Improving Your Writing Throughout Your Career,” speaks to one of the important themes every lawyer and writer should accept. Legal writing is a process, not an event, requiring continual refinement throughout your career.

A writer does not peak in the sense that an athlete might. Good writers know they can always get better, and that the improvement process is a career-long journey.

Wayne’s seventh suggestion is especially near to my heart ― accept critique. That’s a lesson I learned about a hundred years ago as a young associate at Big Firm. Today I run a service called AppellatologySM. We’re devoted to helping lawyers improve their appellate briefs. We do that by offering professional advice on how the persuasiveness and readability of your appellate brief can be improved. Our panel of senior lawyers, legal writing experts, retired judges, and scholars conference your brief online, so you can revise it before you file it. You can read more about AppellatologySM by clicking here.

Joe Rivera tried to run for an elected position as alderman in Chicago. But the Chicago Electoral Board upheld an objection to Rivera’s petition, preventing him from appearing on the election ballot.

Rivera then filed a petition in the trial court for review of the Board’s decision. Rather than serving the petition on the individual Board members or the Objectors, Rivera served their lawyers. The Objectors and the Board asked the trial court to dismiss Rivera’s petition because, they argued, the Illinois Election Code required Rivera to serve them personally, not through their attorneys.

The trial court agreed, and dismissed Rivera’s petition. Rivera appealed, but the election had passed by the time the appellate court considered the case. So the first question was whether the appeal was moot because it was impossible for the appellate court to reinstate Rivera to the election ballot.

Guilty as charged. We’re obsessed with good writing and engrossed by lucid argument. Superior writing plus absorbing argument gives us the Ahhhhh of the first cup of morning coffee.

Appellatology is great legal thinkers and writers devoted to helping lawyers write better briefs.

How do we do it? Our panel of mock judges ― senior lawyers, scholars, retired judges, and legal writing experts ― analyzes your draft and confers with you and other mock judges, and tells you how to improve it. We answer your questions, discuss your issues, and give you our independent evaluations. And it’s all done online without the hassle, cost, and expense of leaving your office.

Hadley and David Newton were getting divorced. Grund, an attorney had met with David concerning the divorce, and took notes of the conversation with David. Nonetheless, Grund and Leavitt agreed to represent Hadley in the divorce case.

Grund and Leavitt asked the trial court for an award of Hadley’s attorney fees from David, about $250,000. But David asked the trial court to disqualify Grund and Leavitt from representing Hadley because of a conflict of interest from Grund’s representation of David. Before it ruled on the fee request, the trial court disqualified Grund and Leavitt.

A week later the trial court denied the fee request based on the conflict of interest. At the court hearing, the law firm refused to obey the disqualification order, so the trial court found Grund and Leavitt to be in direct contempt of court.

Anna Wiggen sold a painting to Brian and Kayla Roughton. At the time, Anna was married to Patricia Wiggens’s brother. After Anna and Patricia’s brother divorced, Patricia claimed (1) she was the owner of the painting, and (2) the painting was sold without her consent. Patricia demanded return of the painting, but the Roughtons refused to give it back. So Patricia, who lived in Illinois, sued the Roughtons, who lived in Texas, in an Illinois court.

The Roughtons asked the trial court to dismiss them from the lawsuit because, they claimed, they were not subject to personal jurisdiction by the Illinois court. The trial court first denied the Roughtons’s request to dismiss.

The Roughtons then asked the court to reconsider. They attached Anna’s affidavit to their request for reconsideration, which indicated the Roughtons had limited contacts with Illinois. The trial court ruled in favor of the Roughtons on the reconsideration try and dismissed them from the case.

Okay, I have a unique position for a paralegal, not necessarily a position for a unique paralegal, although uniqueness doesn’t disqualify you.

This is a part time position with flexible hours. Most of the work will be done remotely, with just a bit of on-site work necessary at World Headquarters in the west Chicago suburbs.

Call or email for more information.

The Village of Bellwood, Illinois thought it wanted seven private properties for its own. Bellwood condemned the properties and brought an eminent domain case against the property owners. All of the parties agreed to an amount the property owners would be paid by Bellwood for the properties. The trial court ordered (1) Bellwood would take title upon payment to the property owners, (2) each party waived their right to appeal, and (3) the settlement order was final.

Bellwood reneged on the deal before it paid the property owners. Bellwood claimed the eminent domain statute allowed it to back out of the agreement and to abandon its eminent domain case any time before it took ownership of properties. But the trial court denied Bellwood’s request to abandon the case because “you can’t just go out and make agreements and then all of a sudden back out on them.”

Bellwood appealed, but the property owners contested appellate jurisdiction. They argued (1) the appeal waiver in the trial court’s order prevented Bellwood from appealing, and (2) the order denying Bellwood’s request to abandon the lawsuit was not final and appealable.

Harry Balough was injured in his work maintaining a railroad car. So he sued his employer, the railroad company. A jury awarded him damages of $500,000, but also found he was 40 percent responsible for his injury. So Balough’s award was reduced to $300,000.

Balough then asked the trial court to reinstate the $500,000 verdict. He argued that the statute he sued under did not allow for reduction of a verdict because of his own contributory fault. The trial court agreed, and entered a verdict for the larger amount.

The Railroad appealed, but did not put the facts for the jury’s finding nor for the trial court’s legal ruling into the appellate record. The First District Illinois Appellate Court agreed with trial court’s legal ruling that Balough’s contributory fault could not serve to reduce his full damage award. The appellate court also ruled that presumptions of fact fell in Balough’s favor because it was the Railroad’s burden, as the party appealing, to assure there was an adequate appellate record. Here’s how the appellate court explained it:

This case involved John Crane, Inc.’s claim for insurance coverage, and the insurers’ counterclaim against Crane. The insurers persuaded the trial court to dismiss Crane’s complaint. Two days later, Crane appealed the dismissal.

Then CNA, one of the insurers, asked the trial court to vacate or modify the dismissal order and for leave to amend its counterclaim against Crane. The trial court ruled (1) against CNA and would not allow the judgment to be vacated or modified, (2) for CNA and allowed amendment of the counterclaim against Crane.

Two weeks later, the trial court entered a final judgment on all of the remaining claims except CNA’s counterclaim.

David Hammer was executor of Ronald Weeks’s estate. Hammer hired Thomas Brucker as an attorney to assist in the administration of the estate. Hammer ($120,000) and Brucker ($170,000) paid themselves based on a percentage of the estate’s value.

Weeks left one-fourth of his estate to a New York-based charity. The charity disputed whether Hammer and Brucker could properly take a percentage of the estate for their fees. The Illinois Attorney General intervened in the case, and disputed Hammer’s and Brucker’s fees. The trial court agreed with the Attorney General, drastically lowered the fees, and ordered Hammer and Brucker to return the excess to the estate.

Hammer and Brucker appealed. But their notice of appeal stated that the Estate of Weeks was the party appealing, not Hammer and not Brucker. The Attorney General argued that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the wrong party was identified as the appellant. The Fourth District Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the mistake on the notice of appeal was technical, and did not defeat appellate jurisdiction. Here’s how the appellate court explained the ruling.

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